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Abstract
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to describe the employee perspective of how
leadership influenced their workplace safety in a military environment. The participants in this
case study were observed while working in their normal environment, interviewed, and historical
records were reviewed. During the interviews and observations, the researcher attempted to
describe how the participants engaged in workplace safety with and without their supervisors
present. Data obtained through the case study was analyzed and two major themes emerged: (1)
recreating a military structure; and (2) leading from the front. Based on the data from this case
study, it appears the research site needs to recognize the unique needs veterans bring to the
workplace.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As a young 19-year-old who had just graduated high school, the cold wind chilled my
face with such force my bones felt as if they were freezing to the marrow. Overriding the intense
cold of the Lake Michigan breeze in December was that I was going to be serving my country
with the opportunity to make it better. I had always been blessed to be able to travel the world
without restrictions until September 11th, 2001. At that moment the world changed for me. I can
remember my Pennsylvania State Trooper cousin, a giant of a man who played football at Penn
State, coming home sobbing after what he saw at the Flight 93 crash site. It was his face which
motivated me to want to make my country a better place to be where we didn’t have to see such
horror.
My experiences with September 11th were a direct motivation for me to join the military
in an effort to make a positive impact on my country while also preserving our right to enjoy
freedom. However, my dream of serving in the military was cut short after an unfortunate
workplace accident where I was permanently disabled and never able to walk normally again.
After I was able to return to work, I joined the civil service workforce and yet again, I was
permanently injured through a preventable workplace accident. From these experiences I have
always wondered if my military experience led me to take risks with my personal safety which
were unnecessary, yet there was a culture within the federal government, particularly the
military, which made them acceptable.
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The Federal Government
The federal government is the largest employer in the United States with the Department
of Defense (DOD) being the largest employing federal agency. Thus, the Department of Defense
is often referred to as the largest employer in the country. With over 1.3 million men and women
serving on active duty and 742,000 civilian personnel augmenting the force (OPM, 2016), it is
important to understand how the safety and health of these personnel is protected as their
occupations are often hazardous in nature. The DOD is hazardous in nature as its mission is to
support and defend the Constitution of the United States through any means necessary. Often,
supporting and defending of the Constitution requires military members and associated civilian
counterparts to deploy to foreign lands; live in substandard conditions; and work with explosives,
nuclear weapons, and ammunition. Such hazardous conditions are very difficult to replicate in
the private sector and there is minimal research about these conditions.
Although it is often considered to be just active duty service members serving in the
hazardous areas, the civilians who fill the bulk of the DOD’s workforce must be considered as
well. There is little to no research on whether civilians in a military workplace are as safe as or
safer than their private industry counterparts. Research is also lacking in whether the unique
leadership dynamics of the military impacts safety in the workplace for civilians who work for
the military. The dynamics of leadership and whether they play a part in civilian workforce
safety is important, particularly in a military work environment where there are both military and
civilian leaders supervising civilian employees. With the DOD spending at least $10 billion
annually on workers’ compensation payments, it would behoove the government to have
research about safety in the federal work place (SMSCX.org, 2016).

2

In an attempt to answer these questions, this dissertation is a case study on civilian
employee perception of leadership and workplace safety in a military environment. The case
study is intended to identify any perceived barriers to safety by the employees in a military
environment and also seeks to understand how leadership involved in the workplace impacts
employee safety. The case study was based on interviews with employees at a large military
installation which was attempting to reduce the number of safety accidents occurring there. The
first chapter of this dissertation presents the background, specifies the program, and describes the
significance of this study. It also presents an overview of the methodology used and concludes
with noting the delimitations of the study and definitions of key terms used.
Background of Study
Prior to the year 1970, there was no workplace safety oversight by the federal
government. This presented an unsafe work environment as people could literally die on the job
as prevailing sentiment was they could easily be replaced (Maddux, 2016). However, 1970
brought the inception of the Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) which sought to
regulate safety in all workplaces across the United States (Bennett & Deitch, 2007). Through
enacting federal regulations, creating standards for safety in the workplace, and actively
enforcing safety in the workplace through physical inspections, OSHA was able to tremendously
reduce the amount of injuries and deaths in the American workplace (Maddux, 2016).
OSHA filled the gap in how to oversee civilian mishaps, or mishaps that involve nonmilitary employees. Each organization is different in how they structure their safety department,
but every organization has a safety professional who is responsible for ensuring all OSHA, state,
and local regulations are met. Within DOD, there is a base safety office which oversees all
safety for civilians and liaisons with individual units for inspections. All units also have their
3

safety professional who is the subject matter expert, available for the commanding officer’s
needs.
With each DOD installation tracking their civilian safety accidents and reporting them to
OSHA, there is a disconnect in how military accidents are tracked, or accidents involving active
duty service members. Each branch of the military has their own safety departments which
report to the Secretaries of their respective branches, but more often than not this information is
not shared amongst peer groups. There is no civilian research which has tried to quantify
military accidents, best practices, or root causes, or at least which has been publicly shared. The
reason OSHA is not involved in military safety is because much of what occurs during military
operations is considered “military specific”, thus there are no like industries to compare the data
to.
With the advent of OSHA, DOD civilians were now being governed under the federal
rules while their military counterparts were left to their own devices. Organizations were
individually left to determine how to gain employee involvement, thus, compliance to
regulations with a civilian population working with military members. OSHA took the best
practices learned from the safest organizations over three decades and created the Voluntary
Protection Program (VPP) as an avenue to offer organizations mishap reduction goals (Bennett
& Deitch, 2007). It was not until 2003, when the DOD decided to place safety at the forefront of
their mission that they began to participate in the VPP. Then Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, mandated a 50% reduction in civilian mishaps and later revised his goal to 75% in
2008 in an effort to reduce the annual $10-21 billion workers’ compensation bill he had from his
employees.
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Safety had not been on the forefront of DOD leaders’ minds for a variety of reasons, but
as the United States was engaged in a two-front war, the money saved from preventable mishaps
was likely a primary motivating factor. As a result, many military organizations such as the
Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, White Sands Mille Range Fire Department, U.S. Army
Center for Environmental Health Research, and U.S. Naval Ship Repair Facility and Japan
Regional Maintenance Center implemented VPP as a way to meet the mishap reduction goals set
forth by Rumsfeld (SMSCX.org, 2016).
VPP was founded on several principles relating to adult learning, organizational design,
and leadership styles. By creating a culture based on principles encouraging people to work
together and lead with a conscience, the VPP has been extremely successful in reducing mishaps
(Bennett & Deitch, 2007). According to OSHA, of organizations who have successfully
implemented VPP all have witnessed at least an average of 55% reduction in workers’
compensation costs, a 70% decrease in accidents, a decrease in union grievances of 75%, a 90%
increase in employee involvement in workplace improvement, and 85% increase in customer
satisfaction in product produced by VPP organizations (Bennett & Deitch, 2007). Basically, all
organizations who have implemented VPP have reduced costs associated with injuries, increased
morale, and have increased customer satisfaction.
The demographics of VPP is varied and is not considered a factor in the success of the
program. According to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)’s annual Federal Employee
Viewpoint Survey (2016), the federal government is the largest employer in America. As a
collective whole, males and females are represented equally in the entire organization with 73%
of the population holding at least a four-year degree (OPM, 2016). Almost half of the federal
government organization, 44%, hold jobs in senior positions from paygrades GS-13 to GS-15
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which start at a minimum of $74,584 per year without any locality pay. Of the total population,
46% are Baby Boomers while 41% are from Generation X, and only 12% of the population is
represented by Generation Y. Of the total population, only 27% of have served in the military
(OPM, 2016). To summarize, the average employee working for the federal government had a
four-year undergraduate degree and was between the ages of 35-65 with about one in four being
military veterans.
Specific to the DOD, civilians make up 24.1% of the total people employed with 46.9%
of the total workforce being veterans (OPM, 2016). The Marine Corps civilian force accounts
for only 2.6% of the total civilian work force in the DOD, with approximately 19,130 people
(OPM, 2016). Of the total population of Marine Corps civilians, 42.7% of them identify as
veterans (FedHire.org, 2016). At the research site, approximately 75% of the population were
veterans and 90% were males over the age of 42. The average likelihood of a DOD employee
being a veteran was just under 50/50; specifically, to the organization studied, three out of four
employees were veterans. In this case study, it is important to understand the dynamics of the
workforce in the event the life experiences of the participants impact the way they view
leadership and safety. A strong military background might indicate a predisposition to certain
types of leadership, views of safety, or nothing at all based on my personal experience.
Statement of the Problem
There is a problem with civilian employees getting hurt in the federal government.
Despite implementing the VPP, the DOD is still suffering huge budget deficits due to paying out
injury claims (SMSCX.org, 2016). This problem is not only impacting the immediate people
within the organization who are picking up the slack when someone gets hurt, but people are
getting hurt from preventable mishaps with the American people footing the bill. A case study
6

which explores the relationship between leadership and employee safety through interviews,
observations, and data collection and analysis will shed light on the problem.
During a time of fiscal austerity, spending $10 billion or more per year on injuries seems
like a blatant waste of money which could be allocated elsewhere (SMSCX.org, 2016). With a
balanced budget not much more than a distant memory, finding a solution to the problem of why
military installations have a higher rate of accidents per person than private sector industries is
important to reducing the costs of workplace injuries the American taxpayers are funding.
To date, there has been little to any formal research conducted to determine why federal
employees, particularly on military installations, have accident rates at least twice that of the
national average for comparable industries. Of the research which has been conducted, it has
focused on leadership styles of military personnel (Creech, n.d.; Williams, 2009; Yeakey, 2002)
with one other article focusing on how to gain employee involvement in workplace safety (Blair,
2013). Much of the remaining research focused on workplace safety in the public sector (Forck,
2019; Maddux, 2016; Pater & Kroon, 2011) and how leadership impacts gaining employee buyin to a safety culture (Pater, 2012; Winn, 2014). Much research (Creech, n.d.; Galbraith &
Fouch, 2007; Horan, 2013; Pater, 2012; Pater & Kroon, 2011) indicated safety in the workplace
was contingent on employees becoming stakeholders in their own safety through empowerment
from their leadership, creating a safety culture where safety was viewed as a top priority in
achieving the daily mission. The gap between what literature currently has and what the basis of
this study is that current literature does not do research with the/on military and/or the civilian
population working alongside the active duty military.
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Research Purpose
The purpose of this exploratory case study is to describe how senior leaders impact
workplace safety in a military environment as well as how military experience impacts employee
perception of workplace safety in a military workplace. The theories of andragogy (Ingalls,
1976; Knowles, 1980), emotional intelligence (Cherniss, 2000; George, 2000; Goleman, 1995),
and organizational design and culture theory (Hunsicker, 2004; Schein, 1992; Weber, 1947),
were used to view the case study site through the lens of a cognitive learner. The case study took
place at one of the largest training military installations in the United States over a month time
frame and included 20 participants for interviews, observations, and document reviews.
Research Questions
Two research questions served as a guide for this study:
1. How do senior leaders impact workplace safety in a military work environment?
2. How does military experience impact employee perception of workplace safety in a
military work environment?
The preceding questions outline the basis for this case study which seeks to understand the
role of leadership in workplace safety. These questions will allow for a better understanding of
senior leaders impact workplace safety on a military installation and how prior military
experience impacts employee perception of workplace safety in a military environment.
Significance of Study
With the American government facing another year of an unbalanced budget and a deficit
of billions of dollars, the need for conserving resources is paramount. The DOD spends $10-21
billion annually on workers’ compensation reparations which comes directly from their operating
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budget (SMSCX.org, 2016). If even half of the workers’ compensation budget was reduced, the
DOD would be saving billions of dollars to use towards national security, employee incentives,
and technology. This study is significant to all American tax payers who want to understand
some of the budget constraints the federal government is under, but more importantly this study
is important for the leadership of the DOD. Leadership with the DOD can at least take this study
to understand whether military experience creates preconceived expectations by employees as
well as if the military veteran workforce has different leadership needs which impact how they
view their own personal safety in the workplace.
Theoretical Framework
This study draws on andragogy (Ingalls, 1976; Knowles, 1980), theory of emotional
intelligence (Cherniss, 2000; George, 2000; Goleman, 1995), and organizational design and
culture theory (Hunsicker, 2004; Schein, 1992; Weber, 1947). Drawing on andragogy (Ingalls,
1972; Knowles, 2012) to better understand the theories of adult motivation, this study views
motivation through the idea that adults are intrinsically or extrinsically (Ryan & Deci, 2000)
motivated to learn and change their behaviors in accordance with the goals of the motivators in
their environments. In order to motivate and lead employees towards desired organizational
goals, leaders are required to determine what the motivators are and leverage this knowledge to
better engage their employees which is viewed through the theory of emotional intelligence
(Cherniss, 2000; George, 2000; Goleman, 1995). It is pertinent to the study to understand
motivation as there must be motivational factors in order to get the employees to change their
behavior, if it is unsafe.
In order to understand how the structure of an organization impacts the motivation of
employees, organization and structure theory (Hunsicker, 2004; Schein, 1992; Weber, 1947)
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further frame this research as the structure of any organization either helps or hinders leaders in
motivating their employees. Moreover, organizational design and structure directly influences
organizational culture which contributes to employee motivation in learning or engaging in a
change of behavior based on the principles of andragogy (Knowles, 2012). Hunsicker (2004),
Schein (1992), and Weber (1947) discuss how different models of organizational design
influence the success of communication within an organization. When organizations are
structured in a top-down approach as the military is, communication is restricted which can
influence the morale of employees as well as create a negative organizational culture.
Understanding the impact a structure can have is important to this case study in order to
understand if there are any barriers leaders face while trying to effectively lead and motivate
employees as well as if organizational structure impacts the ability of employees to share their
safety concerns.

Theory

Scholars

Relevant Elements of Theory

Andragogy

Knowles (2005)

Adults are motivated to learn new
behavior and engage in it based
on internal or external factors. If
they are not properly motivated
to engage in safe behavior by
leadership, they are not going to
do it.

Andragogy

Ingalls (1976)

Employees needed to have a
culture where learning was
respected, and mistakes were
viewed as learning opportunities.
If employees were not respected
in the workplace, they were less
likely to want to learn safe
behavior or take the extra steps
needed to be safe.
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Organizational Design and
Structure

Weber (1947)

Bureaucratic model structure is
the way the military is structured.
It features a top down approach
where each subsequent level has
less control over their work and
resources.

Organizational Design and
Structure

Hunsicker (2004)

Communication in a bureaucratic
model is one way and is top
down. No room for creativity,
recognizing employee
innovation, or process
improvement.

Organizational Design and
Structure--Culture

Schein (2004)

Communication is how a culture
is relayed to the organizational
members. It is crucial to allow
the organization to adapt to a
changing environment.

Table 1. Theoretical Framework
Assumptions
The assumptions for the case study are as follows:
1. Participants will answer the questions honestly and the responses were reflective
of their beliefs.
2. This military installation is representative of other large, military installations.
Through participation in this case study, participants were encouraged to share the stories and
experiences which shaped their perception on leadership and workplace safety. They were
invited to discuss their unique experiences in the workplace as well as how those experiences
shaped the way they interact with their peers in the organization. It is assumed all answers were
honest and upfront in the spirit of helping to determine the best practices of safety leadership
within a unique federal government organization.
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Delimitations
Employees were randomly selected to be interviewed in December 2016 at a large
operational military base in the United States. The participants were selected only based on the
fact they were employees of the installation.
Limitations
The limitations for this for this study are as follows:
1. This study focused on a select number of factors which may impact workplace safety,
but there are a variety of other factors which may impact safety such as cognitive ability,
emotional state, natural disasters, and experience in the workplace.
2. This study does not look at other military branches which may or may not have a
different culture or social view of safety. The difference between fundamental missions across
the branches was not established or evaluated for this study.
Definition of Terms
The following terms were relevant to the study.
•

Department of Defense, or DOD, is the largest branch of the American federal
government and is charged with protecting the American people from threats
foreign and domestic.

•

Civilian or civilians, are terms used to describe the non-active duty personnel who
work for the military. The term refers to civil servants who work for the federal
government. It does not apply to people who have no affiliation to the military
whether on active duty or working for the military.
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•

Employees, followers, and members are terms used interchangeably to describe
the people who make up non-supervisory billets within an organization. They
may or may not have bought into the mission of the organization.

•

Intelligence, or emotional intelligence, is the ability to read and manage personal
emotions as well as read and manage the emotions of other people (Goleman,
1995).

•

Leadership is a process to influence individuals to achieve a common goal
(Northouse, 2012). It is also a term used to describe individuals at top levels of
management who make unilateral decisions impacting large segments of the
organization.

•

Leaders are individuals who are holding managerial or supervisory billets and use
the leadership process to achieve a common goal. Leaders are formally
recognized by the organization and stakeholders by the billets they hold.

•

Learning is a permanent change in behavior as well as how knowledge is acquired
(Galbraith & Fouch, 2007). It occurs when there is a motivation to do so, whether
positive or negative; intrinsic or extrinsic; in adults.

•

Military organizations are workplaces comprised of civilians and active duty
members who work towards the common overarching goal of defending national
freedom.

•

Stakeholders are individuals who believe in the mission of the organization and
actively seek to achieve it.

•

Workplace safety is the measure of accidents and injuries within an organization.
The goal is for no accidents or injuries to occur in the workplace. However, when
13

an accident or injury does occur it must be studied to find the root cause and
determine what factors could have prevented it.
Defining the key terms of this study is essential to understanding the nuances of working
in a military environment. Without a fundamental understanding of what the key terms mean,
the ability to understand the significance of the study may be lost in translation.
Study Overview
The remainder of this study is organized into four chapters and the bibliography. Chapter
2 presents a review of literature detailing leadership development on a macro level as well as
specifically within the military. Chapter 3 outlines the research design and methodology with
inclusion of the procedures followed for data collection and analysis. Chapter 4 describes the
findings of the study while Chapter 5 discusses the implications and conclusions based on the
findings and the potential topics for future research.
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Chapter 2
Review of Literature
In this chapter, the literature reviewed for adult learning theories, organizational design,
and leadership styles are discussed. Little to no research has been published on how adult
learning impacts informal learning in a military workplace. Military workplaces are unique for
both military members and their civilian counterparts as the Congressional restraints and
privileges afforded there are different than the private sector. The opportunity for cross-training
within the organization is immense as the government employs almost every type of occupation
possible. One of the biggest defining differences is the mission which is to serve the public
whether it is by fighting foreign wars or servicing national parks. Such differences create a
unique environment which has not been studied enough to understand the impact it places on the
employees.
Origins of Adult Learning
The idea of adult learning was first labeled “andragogy” by German high school teacher,
Alexander Kapp (1833). Kapp’s position on adult learning was it had to occur through selfreflection and life experience before a teacher could make any headway which was different than
the way children learned when they were required to enroll in school for a prescribed number of
years. Another German, Rosenstock-Huessy (1925) furthered defined Kapp’s “andragogy” by
saying life experiences were crucial to learning from our mistakes. History, according to
Rosenstock-Huessy, was the foundation for adult learning as humans had to look at history and
the human experiences to prevent making the same mistakes again.
Lindeman (1926) worked with Rosenstock-Huessy on andragogy in Germany and then
brought it back to the United States. Lindeman’s position on adult learning and andragogy was it
15

could not take place without discussion; discussion was the foundation for self-reflection and
learning from historical mistakes, whether personal and public. It was Lindeman’s efforts which
brought the term “andragogy” to America, but simultaneously, other practitioners were working
on the concept of adult learning and how it could impact America.
Americans Thorndike, Bregman, Tilton, and Woodyard (1928) studied adult learning and
published their findings in their book Adult Learning where they tackled the question of whether
adults could actually learn. Through the early part of the 20th century, researchers sought to
answer the question of whether adults could learn and whether their ability to learn diminished as
they aged (Lorge, 1944). From this research, the idea of intelligence was formed and it sought to
understand whether age impacted not just learning, but overall intelligence (Schaie & Willis,
1986).
The research from the early 20th century was focused on behavior in reference to learning
rather than the ability to learn or alternative means to educating. It was not until Malcolm
Knowles (1968) published his first article on andragogy did adult learning and andragogy
flourish as a legitimate field of study. Knowles theorized adults learned differently than
children, thus they have to be treated differently when they are learning a new skill or
information.
Knowles (1970) published another article in which he further defined exactly what adult
learning was and what the tenants of it were. Knowles’s (1970) tenants were: identified adults
are inherently self-directed; experience forms how they view learning; must have an immediate
need for learning; and must be actively involved in the learning process. The tenants he
proposed were crucial to ensuring adults actually learn the new material, thus need to have their
instruction structured around it.
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Perhaps the world was open to the changes in the adult education field, but in a short
amount of time there was tremendous progress in the field. Ingalls (1972) wrote the first
handbook on andragogy to help educators in their pursuit of better education. The handbook
outlined the process of engaging adult learners in a way which could be implemented in a
consistent, systematic process. Ingalls’s work was so influential the American federal
government implemented it as a pilot program to better educate their workforce. It was also in
his handbook where Ingalls first used the term “trainers” to identify the instructor rather than
traditional terms such as teacher or educator.
Knowles (1975) began to focus his research heavily on the self-directed learning
component of andragogy which saw his guidebook on the topic published. It was the first time
he identified self-directed learning as vital to success of any educational program by outlining
nine pillars to it. Adults engaging in self-directed learning must: be able to collect and validate
evidence; select effective resources and strategies for learning; understand the differences adults
face when learning with a teacher or self; understand the learner is self-directed; recognize
personal needs for learning; translate personal needs into objectives; relate to learning resources;
and identify resources available for different types of learning.
The pillars of self-directed learning Knowles (1975) outlined were expanded by Ingalls
(1976). Ingalls posited corporate learning was different than learning in college, thus there were
nine components to learning in a corporate world. The components were: creating a culture
where employees felt respected; mistakes being viewed as learning opportunities; providing
employees the opportunity to discover their own learning needs; creating learning experiences
from real life work situations; allowing employees to develop their own learning needs and
experiences; allowing employees to conduct gap analysis of their own persons; encouraging
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innovation to improve processes; recognizing and acknowledging employee concerns about
developmental deficits; and creating employee involvement for organizational goals, both short
and long-term (Ingalls, 1976). It was these components which initially set the standard not only
for adult learning in a corporate world, but also acknowledged the idea of having a culture or
climate conducive to learning as important to organizational design.
In 1980, Knowles updated his practitioner handbook, The Modern Practice of Adult
Education, by including the applicability of adult learning to human resources development.
Although this was not a new concept as Thorndike (1928) and others had viewed adult learning
as a means to improve productivity through more skilled workers, it was a major change at the
time because it firmly situated the idea of adult learning and business as being firmly linked.
Also in the update, Knowles (1980) added a fifth assumption to his tenants of adult learning
which was adults must be motivated to learn. Adults motivated extrinsically (external) were
motivated to learn because some outside force is making them. Intrinsic (internal) motivation
was more long lasting as adults actually wanted to learn the knowledge for themselves rather
than because they had to (Knowles, 1980).
A year later, Mezirow (1981) contributed to the field of adult learning when he set forth
twelve core concepts on how to better develop self-direction in adults. The twelve core concepts
are: progressively remove the educator from the learner; help the learner navigate and use
resources; help the learner define his or her learning objectives; help the learner assume control
over how to meet their defined objectives; identify and organize how learning is pertinent to the
learner; encourage learner decision making; assist in establishing criteria for judgements;
encourage self-correcting in learning; facilitate critical thinking through problem solving;
provide supportive feedback; provide modeling; and make the clear distinction between the
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learner understanding his or her choices and encouraging the learner to select a specific choice
(Mezirow, 1981). The core concepts set forth by Mezirow further defined the relationship the
educator was to have with the learner in order to create and develop self-direction. Mezirow
made it very clear the educator was more of a facilitator or guide in learning rather than in the
traditional role of expert; the learners were now more in charge of how and what they learned.
During the 1980s, there was major progress made in the field of adult learning, but it was
not without push back. Jarvis (1987) was one of the major detractors of andragogy as he
believed it had been accepted as fact without any substantial research to ground it. He further
argued it was nothing more than a passing fad; it would disappear when a new fad emerged.
Hartree (1984) echoed this sentiment when she questioned whether there was even a theory at
all. She maintained the tenants of adult learning and self-directed learning were nothing more
than best practices when teaching adults.
Although there was some disagreement in adult learning and andragogy, it has persisted
through the years. In more recent years, the focus has changed from being dependent on the
situation to being learner dependent. In 1984, Knowles acknowledged learning occurred on a
spectrum with the amount of interaction from the instructor and self-direction from the learner
being dependent on the amount of knowledge the learner already has. Thus, andragogy could be
applicable to children if they were already knowledgeable about the topic. Houle (1996) agreed
with this new idea of andragogy being a continuum and furthered it by saying the instructors
should be more cognizant of the type of learners and the climate the learning will occur in. If
instructors have a better understanding what the climate for learning is, the instructor can better
curtail the learning experience to those needs.
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The last 20 years has seen the focus of adult education morph into somewhat legitimizing
it against the detractors. Henschke (1998) started the argument that andragogy was alive and
well in ancient times, not emerging when Kapp (1833) first created the term of “andragogy”.
Kapp’s book where andragogy was first mentioned, actually was based on Plato’s teachings of
adults. Milligan (1995) scientifically investigated andragogy and found at the root of andragogy
was problem-based learning and it was used for centuries in the education of nurses.
During the struggle of legitimization, the focus of adult learning and andragogy has
shifted to include educating adult educators in the theory as well as how to address online
education. Henscke (1998a) advocated the need for adult educators to be taught it before they
move into the classroom. Andragogy must be an attitude and way of being rather than just
another theory or passing fad. Henschke (1998b) pointed out, very effectively, if educators are
not modeling the behavior they seek to teach, then they are teaching something else.
Online education has also become a major focus of andragogy as the number of students
enrolled in online courses has increased drastically. Allen & Seaman (2010) found of the 4.6
million students enrolled in a higher education course during the fall semester of 2008, onequarter of those students were enrolled in an online course. In the same semester, Allen &
Seaman (2010) found online enrollment was up 17% from the previous year. Online education
created an avenue for non-traditional students to enter higher education on terms which were
more conducive to their lives than a formal classroom was.
With the increase of online learners, andragogy and adult learning had to adapt to a
different classroom—a virtual classroom. Chametzky (2014) argued andragogy was the key
principle which must be included when developing a classroom or curriculum for online
education. Through developing a class where learners were self-directed and had to address real
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world problems in the class, Chametzky argues online learning can be just as effective as a
traditional classroom. Stoud (2013) echoes the sentiment but says since learners are often not
accustomed to being empowered through self-direction in the classroom, it is important to
empower the learners in a slow, methodical manner.
The history of andragogy and adult learning has morphed in the almost two centuries it
has been around but continues to be a pillar of educating adults. It is important for any adult
educator to understand the specific needs of adult learners whether they are in a traditional
classroom or in an online environment, to ensure the learners get the most from the education.
Specific to this case study, it is important to understand if andragogy and adult learning impact
the way employees want to learn or have information pertinent to their jobs conveyed to them.
Traditional Organizational Design and Culture
Organizational design. Organizations were defined by March and Simon (1958) as
systems who have coordinated action amongst stakeholders who differ in goals, interests, and
knowledge. Daft (2007) argued organizations only exist when people interact with each other to
achieve a common goal. Robbins (1990) posits organizations are social groups for people with
specific goals and has definable boundaries. The overarching theme of organizations are they
involved people, but as to what and how people are involved has changed as time has progressed.
The first formal mention of organizational theories was in Max Weber’s 1946 treatise on
rational organizations and authority (Jex, 2003). Although there has been a history of people
organizing people and logistics dating back to Nicolo Machiavelli (1505) and Sun Tzu (Giles,
1910), Weber is thought to be the first modern theorist on how organizations function and what
specifically they do.
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Weber noted organizations in the modern era first began around the Industrial
Revolution. The Victorian workers sought to have order and structure which was solved through
the bureaucratic model of organizational design. Essentially, bureaucracy was the top down
approach where the senior person was in the leader role because of his technical knowledge and
expertise. The boss’s word was generally the final word and there was no concept of employee
morale or improving efficiency through employee creativity.
The bureaucratic model of organizational design is likely still the most popular model of
organizations (Hunsicker, 2004). It is characterized with rigid and stringent policies and
procedures. It is resistant to change but is highly organized with clear expectations of all
employees as well as the many levels of management within the organization. Formality is
valued and adherence to the guidelines is imperative. Communication is a one-way model
starting at the top and flowing down (Hunsicker, 2004). There is little to no room for creativity,
process improvement, or recognizing individual employees for achievements.
Within the bureaucratic model, the functional structure and the divisional structure are
two sub-models which add further layers of management between the lowest worker and the
ultimate decision maker, or boss. The functional structure is the simplest approach as it is top
down with few deviations, but it is not always the best model of organizational design
(Hunsicker, 2004). The functional structure forces managers and employees to work within their
field of specialty without deviating or experiencing other departments or fields. It is difficult to
react to customer needs from this standpoint as the employees cannot anticipate secondary and
tertiary impacts of changes as they only understand the singular process they are involved in.
The divisional structure is similar to the functional structure as it is very narrow in focus
for employees, but differs in that the organization groups like skills together to better manage
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resources (Hunsicker, 2004). For instance, instead of having an organization where online
marketing and paper marketing are separate entities like they would be in the functional
structure, all different types of marketing would be grouped together under one marketing
department in the divisional structure. Having all like products working under one manager
allows for ideas and best practices to be shared, but the issue of the different departments not
talking to each other remains. In both the functional and divisional structures, each department
or specialty remains isolated from the each other in an organization which creates a waste of
resources, duplication of efforts, and makes change extremely slow.
A team structure approaches organizational design not on the functions of each member,
but rather on the organizational goals and how to answer them (Hunsicker, 2004). Taking
members with a variety of skill sets, the team structure groups them based on their ability to
create a holistic answer to an organizational structure. This is a very successful form of
organizational structure and design as several layers of management seen in bureaucratic
structures can be removed. Employees have more motivation as they are empowered to make
change. However, there are drawbacks as there are more meetings to discuss the results of each
objective and some employees can be conflicted as to whether they should be loyal to their
functional discipline or their team.
A final organizational design structure which is common is the network structure. In the
network structure the organizational core remains, but many of the functions are contracted out
to other organizations (Hunsicker, 2004). While the overhead is low, the network structure has
little control over what is produced or any administrative delays. The organization itself has
fewer members and the culture becomes less diverse due to the lack of members.
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Organizational culture. An organization’s culture is directly impacted by its design.
Defined, organizational culture determines the set of values and beliefs which are integral parts
of how an organization functions (Davenport & Prusak, 2000). Goodall (1993) argues
organizational culture rests heavily on the shared meaning of artifacts, beliefs, and values
organizational members make. Schein (1992) further defines organizational culture as a shared
set of basic assumptions within a group, learned from problem solving needed for adaptation. As
new members join the organization, these shared set of basic assumptions are imparted on the
new members as the correct way to think and work within the organization.
All organizational cultures depend on communication to share the set of basic
assumptions with members. The varying levels of communication found in organizational
design structures impact the type of culture which will be created. Schein (2004) posits
communication is crucial for an organizational culture to adapt to the environment around it.
Through communication, organizations share their changing missions, values, and beliefs as they
respond to the environment. Without strong communication, Schein argues the culture of an
organization will suffer through divergent subcultures being created. The subcultures create
competing beliefs and values which take precedence over the time and resources of the
organization.
Denison (1990) further postulates organizational culture will develop around one of four
distinct tenants. The consistency tenant believes a culture will develop around a common
perspective, shared beliefs, enhance internal coordination, and promote a sense of organizational
identification on the members. This tenant encourages stability and sees an organizational
culture developing around internal dynamics. A mission focused culture is what Denison

24

describes as seeking to promote stability in response to external factors through a shared sense of
purpose, strategy, and direction to help organizational members meet their goals.
An involvement culture and an adaptability culture are what Denison (1990) describes as
tenants of organizational cultures seeking to be flexible and adaptable to changing needs. An
involvement tenant is based on the premise that member participation will increase a sense of
ownership over the organization’s success. It will breed loyalty to the organization and is
internally focused which is in contrast to the adaptability tenant. Adaptability is Denison’s
(1990) fourth tenant which sees the organization’s ability to receive and interpret external
messages being enhanced by the shared norms of the organization. Through those shared norms
enhancing the ability of the organization to respond to external queues, the organization has a
better chance of survival and growing with the changing demands of the market they serve.
Although there are a variety of ways to view how culture is created and developed within
an organization, Schein (1992) strongly argues leadership is the key to the success or failure of it.
At the heart of the culture, leaders must recognize how well (or not well) an organization is
functioning. Leaders are responsible for assessing and improving the culture through policies,
procedures, and initiatives of the organization. Effective organizational culture is partially
dependent on how competent a leader is in creating, sharing, and communicating a shared set of
beliefs, particularly the mission, of the organization (Schein, 2004).
To sustain an organizational culture in an ever-changing environment, Schein (1992)
argues, it must be proactive rather than reactive. If the organization is continuously reacting to
events and external stressors, it cannot focus on developing the talents and abilities of the
members internally. Organizations who are reactive spend resources and manpower on
responding to issues rather than using those same resources on developing members into more
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well-rounded assets, designing new processes, or investing in new technology to better assist the
organization. Schein firmly believes the energy and resources wasted on reactivity is a culture
killer.
The relationships within an organization are also key elements to sustaining it through an
ever-changing environment. Task-orientated organizations are centered on the success of
production without taking into consideration the importance of the people behind the production.
Weber (1947) noted employees became more productive when they were recognized by
leadership instead of ignored or dismissed. The idea of being relationship-orientated within an
organization is another key to a successful organizational culture according to Schein (1992).
Organizations which embrace the diversity of the workforce and leverage it to the benefit of the
organization have better cultures as members feel as if they are important to the overall success
of the mission. The relationships created between employees and management further
strengthens the idea of organizational culture as employees feel a personal responsibility to
assisting their peers and leadership.
Organizational design and culture are important components to the success or failure of
an organization as they account for the human factor. Organizations with a very rigid structure
tend to minimize the importance of open communication, thus have less of a positive
organizational culture. In contrast, organizations with less management or management who are
actively engaged with all levels of members, have a better culture which leads to easier
adaptability to changing requirements and higher levels of innovations. Pertinent to this case
study, organizational design and culture describe the various layers of leadership, bureaucracy,
and how they impact the way employees perceive their workplace.
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Military Organizational Design and Culture
Organizational design. The design and structure of any organization dictates the
fashion in which information is disseminated. Research by Hunsicker (2004) has indicated the
federal government, particularly the military has a top down approach. This type of
organizational design allows for levels subsequent to impart their interpretation or assumptions
about the information until the end users receive it with a completely different meaning or
direction than the original intent, based on personal experience.
Instead of a free-flowing communication channel, the organizational design has created a
top down approach with an emphasis on accounting for the same data multiple times. Creech
(n.d.) found such an approach created a climate of distrust and diminished morale with the lack
of free-flowing communication. Stakeholders in the organization could not trust the word of
their leaders who were often more engaged with meeting requirements than the needs of the
people in the organization. Stakeholders no longer valued the needs of their leaders; their own
needs were neglected by unnecessary requirements on their personal time, among other things, as
illustrated above by the leaders, thus the stakeholders were unwilling to view the leaders as
worth anything more than requirements they would give their bare minimum effort to. Creech
also stated innovation comes with communication, but with communication only flowing one
way, innovation is dying.
To better understand the impacts of the lack of communication, Pater & Kroon (2011)
state to look at the accident record of organizations. In organizations designed to increase
communications from any level to another, safety accidents are going to be minimal. Individuals
will feel comfortable to report issues or concerns they have with leadership at varying levels,
producing an organization with positive, tangible results. According to Pater & Kroon (2011), in
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organizations where communication is poor or minimal, safety accidents will be higher than their
industry peers as members will feel uncomfortable reporting issues due to the belief leadership
does not care or will not act on it. Such organizations often have top down approaches and
create consequences for going above your direct leader or “jumping the chain-of-command.” In
essence, people who do not accept the response from their immediate supervisor regarding an
issue and go to the next leadership level are sanctioned formally and informally. Pater & Kroon
(2011) also found organizations with high safety accident records had high mistrust in leadership
from their motivations to their intentions. Members were less likely to report accidents as they
did not trust leadership to be honest or not penalize the member for making a report. The fear of
retribution by leadership was one of the worst consequences of poor communication.
Pater (2012) found organizations structured with easy access to all levels of leadership
also had lower safety accidents due to the empowerment the lower level members felt. The
lower level members felt empowered to make changes when they spotted unsafe conditions or
actions immediately instead of either continuing with status quo or waiting for their supervisor to
act on their concerns. Empowered members also created an environment of innovation as the
members felt comfortable to make changes to work processes not only to be safer, but to increase
efficiency. Such organizations clearly reaped multiple rewards from opening communication
channels to multiple levels of members whether the members actually used them or not.
Creech (n.d.) advocates for a “bottoms-up” approach to leadership in the military as it
will create leaders at all levels who are empowered to make change happen. When there is a topdown approach to leadership, communication can be difficult and Creech identifies the barriers it
creates to success: not listening. Leaders must listen more than they speak in order to be
accessible and establish feedback loops with the workforce. Without the open lines of
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communication to provide guidance, expectations, and feedback, employees will have no idea
how they are doing within the organization.
Innovation occurs when regular people work with other regular people to combine
thoughtful ideas in an original way (Pick, 2009). Organizations must be structured in a way
which allows people from all areas of the organization to communicate and pool ideas.
Segregating the organization based on type of work or work function prevents people from
utilizing their experiences to innovate new processes and products. Pick (2009) points to AlQaeda as a superb example of how communication from all over the world led to innovation.
Al-Qaeda was able to connect with support across the international community and shift the face
of battle. Instead of the close-armed conflict with the combatants wearing uniforms of the past,
Al-Qaeda has shifted to unknown assailants who preferred remote combat through propaganda
and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which makes fighting very difficult for the defenders.
Pick (2009) further argues innovation occurs when people view the world through a
different lens than what they are comfortable with. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
found it was difficult to combat child molesters from the internet who were praying on preteen
girls as most of the agents were older males. Instead of ignoring the problem or refusing
innovation, the FBI recruited females to school them on how to communicate and behave as
preteens. Viewing the world through the lens of preteens allowed FBI agents to effectively
behave as the target and reduce child crime.
Organizational design is also critical to structuring the mechanisms to encourage
employee loyalty. The mission of any organization is the goal, the end-state which must occur in
order to consider the organization successful. The mission will occur, but the cost of it will
differ. When employees are loyal, they are willing to work harder, smarter, and faster for the
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same price as they are when they do not feel as if they have a stake in the success of
organization. At the most basic level, when employees feel as if they are part of the team and
they have loyalty to the organization and will go above and beyond what is required to ensure the
mission is complete. Horan (2013) offers committees as a way to engage employees to become
stakeholders.
Committees with the backing of leadership allow stakeholders to offer suggestions as
ways to improve the organization from the people who make up the majority of it (Horan, 2013).
Pick (2009) would say these committees would allow stakeholders the ability to innovate by
bringing together stakeholders from different areas of the organization and Knowles (2012)
would add such committees would create the opportunity for adults to be actively engaged in
their learning.
Horan’s (2013) committees are an opportunity for organizational stakeholders to be
empowered to better the organization. Stakeholders have an opportunity to act on issues which
impact the organization with knowledge they have the power to make lasting change. Horan
posits committee members become empowered and begin to take the initiative for continuous
improvement process, thus reduce accidents.
Committees allow stakeholders from all over the organization to work together to view the
organization through multiple lenses, creating solutions to overarching problem.
A secondary benefit of committees is the diversity they can potentially create. Horan
(2013) suggests committees must contain a member from each department within the
organization and limit the number of leaders on the committee. Pick (2009) would agree and
offer innovation would better occur with the variety of life experiences working together. Sutton
(2002) argues if you are an expert on a subject, seek out those who are layman in the field. Their
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lack of bias on the subject will be drastically different than the experts. Heuer (1999) further
argues for people to work with those whom they disagree. In addition, Heuer adds that if you
work with people you do not like, you are likely to get a different opinion and view the topic
through a lens you were unfamiliar with.
Organizational design is crucial to creating an environment where employees want to be
stakeholders in the organization; they feel as if they directly have an impact on the organization.
With organizations structured to allow communication to flow through all levels without
barriers, stakeholders are empowered to make immediate changes and action issues which are
crucial to the success of the organization.
Organizational culture. How does a goldfish define what “wet” is? Articulating
exactly what makes up the military culture is just as inherently difficult as a goldfish defining
what “wet” is as there are multiple levels of culture which must be examined, but fundamentally
the culture is unique and something which is not tangible (Luby, 2012). The culture can be
described as an iceberg with the most of it being unseen and felt; the tip of the iceberg is the
minimal amount of the military culture which is exposed to the world for view. McAuliffe
(2013) described the iceberg concept with the most easily observed parts of culture being surface
culture, or the tip of the iceberg, and the deep culture being what outsiders cannot experience or
understand as they are not part of the culture.
Language is one of the surface level aspects of military culture. Huebner (2013)
described encountering military language as like navigating a foreign country with a language
being vital to the success of the navigation, but with little understanding of it. Each military
branch has their own set of acronyms which are specific to the mission and gear of that branch
(U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2014). Some terms do not translate over from branch to
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branch as the missions are unique; the lack of applicability and transferability of some words can
create communication barriers for the veterans themselves.
Rank and structure are also unique components in the American military. The structure
is very rigid with guiding rules about who can interact on a personal level with whom, how
interactions will be initiated between different ranks on a professional level, and the amount of
respect each rank will be shown by other ranks (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2014).
Rank also dictates the type of financial resources members and their families have access to
(Huebner, 2013). The strict dictation of interaction often spills over into family life as military
members have regulations placed on whom their family members can interact with even though
the family members are not in the military (Drummet, Coleman, & Cable, 2003).
Moving beyond the surface culture of language, rank, and structure, the core of military
culture lies with a personal sense of rules, regulation, self-expectations, and self-sacrifice. The
sense of rules and regulations is really the sense of duty for military members. The military has
ultimate control over military members’ lives including where they live, what type of sexual
contact they can have, what they can say, and how often they will see their families. Private
sector jobs cannot punish employees for political beliefs, living in a dirty house, drinking under
age, fighting with a spouse, or sharing political opinions online—all of which are punishable
under the Uniformed Military Code of Justice (UCMJ) (Lawson, 2012). The military’s sense of
regulation and duty are all encompassing for the lives of military members which creates a
unique sense of culture not seen in any other profession.
Sense of duty and regulation extend past the personal lives of military members, creating
a sense of unity rather than self. The culture creates a sense of the team or unit being primary
over the sense of self. In combat, it is important to consider actions which will impact the team
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as all members are needed to complete the mission. Of a study by the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs (2014), 63% of veterans refused to seek needed medical treatment because they
did not want to seem different or “weak” by their leadership. Their sense of duty was to the unit
and did not want to be seen as the weakest link on the team. Further, 59% of veterans surveyed
(U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2014) were afraid to seek medical treatment as they did
not want their team to lose confidence in their abilities.
The military culture has placed a major emphasis on not admitting the service member is
hurt, thus being seen as weak. In the article From the Warlords (2003) Sergeant Major (SgtMaj)
Paul Berry (2003, p. 1) articulates: “Marines will not tell you they are sick until they go down
hard. They are a proud bunch.” SgtMaj Berry accurately describes the culture of health and
wellness of the military in general—they view being sick as a sign of weakness, thus detracting
from their abilities to lead. The Department of Veterans Affairs (2014) data also supports the
fundamental fact of military members and veterans adversity to admitting an accident or injury
has occurred. It is viewed as a sign of weakness and being the weak one in the group appears to
be the last thing anyone wants.
Military culture is a microcosm within the United States and the nuances of it create
structure, protocol, and taboos which prevent injuries from being properly addressed.
Understanding that most of the military culture is unspoken and unseen is important as it must be
addressed before change can occur. With the majority of people working for the DOD being
veterans (OPM, 2016), breaking down the barriers of seeking medical treatment and reporting
poor leadership must be acknowledge before change can occur. Without breaking away from the
potentially negative aspects of military culture, a positive change towards safety and preventable
injuries cannot occur. Specific to this case study, the barriers created by military culture can
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prevent employees from reporting their poor leadership while also getting hurt due to
preventable accidents.
Adult Learning in Organizational Learning
Organizational learning was defined by Watkins and Marsick (1992) as organizations
with complete and total employee involvement in the process of creating, modeling, and altering
shared values; all members also hold each other accountable for failing to uphold the shared
values. Hodgkinson (2000) further described organizational learning as people coming together
to support and encourage each other’s learning which benefits the organization in the long-term.
Reynolds and Ablett (1998) view organizational learning as the learning within an organization
where learning changes the behavior of the organizational members. The common theme
amongst the different definitions is learning being the lynchpin for altering the future and shape
of an organization.
Organizational design directly impacts organizational learning in that organizational
learning requires clear communication and consensus on what the shared vision and goals are
(Baldomir, 2009). Watkins and Marsick (1992) posit learning organizations are created with a
democratic approach to learning; employees of all levels work together to identify their needs for
learning and change within the organization. Senge (1990) found it was crucial to articulate the
importance of sharing information within an organization, furthering the position of the
organizational design being one which communication was free-flowing. The empowerment
employees have from being able to communicate their needs and concerns with all levels of
leadership further strengthens their loyalty to the learning organization (Wheatley, 2001).
In a traditional environment, organizational learning means an organization is flexible
enough to change to meet the needs of the people who comprise the organization. This is in
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relationship to the principles of adult learning which are to allow learners to be self-directed and
empowered in their learning. When organizational members are empowered in identifying what
they need to learn, they are more likely to retain the knowledge. Hertel, Niedner, and Herrmann
(2003) further validated this idea when their research found when organizations openly
communicated their information and research with fellow members, the organization shifted to
being more productive and learning-focused.
Knowles (1980) also argued it was important to take into consideration that learners have
to see the value in learning the material; they have to see how it is pertinent to their current lives
or their future goals. Through the clear communication goals of the organization, leaders were
more successful in getting the employees to find the value of learning a new technique, or more
importantly, be innovative and finding solutions to problems within the organization (Hamel &
Prahalad, 1994). Kerka (1995) argued when organizational leaders effectively communicate
how the overall mission impacts the members, the members will link their individual
performance to the achievement of organizational goals. Essentially, members need to
understand why the organizational mission is pertinent to them; when they do, organizational
members will directly link their personal success to the success of the mission, thus creating a
strong, personal connection to the organization’s success.
An additional point of adult learning which Knowles (1980) acknowledged was adult
learners are self-directed. Being self-directed means learners need the ability to pick and choose
what they are going to learn. In organizational learning, if members are empowered to choose
what they learn in an attempt to better an organization, they are more likely to feel a personal
connection to the organization. Further, when members are empowered to make decisions as
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well as be innovative, the morale of the organization increases while the effectiveness also
increases.
Self-direction does not just improve an organization’s individual success, it also fosters
team work. Senge (1990) says any learning organization must have team work as a major
component or it will not be successful. While employees are self-directed, they are empowered
to learn about new information and then share it back with their peers. Knowles (1980) said
adults have a vast wealth of experience which must be considered when educating adults. In the
case of where organizational members are sharing their new knowledge with their peers, the
team is learning from the experiences of their peers as well as fostering a safe environment to
learn through taking risks (Kerka, 1995).
Adult Learning Applied to a Military Environment
Malcolm Knowles (2012) set forth the guiding principles of adult learning which
included motivating adults to learn the new idea. Motivation is the driving force behind adults
applying themselves to comprehend and retain new information. New information can be an
entire process like how to shoot a M19 service rifle or a small idea such as avoiding the
commissary on pay day due to the line lengths. The information does not have to be taught
formally but can be learned informally as long as the adult can justify the reason for learning to
his or herself.
In the case of a military and civilian work place, adult learning occurs regularly, but
numerous studies have been conducted which found there are major flaws in it. Beginning with
the Revolutionary War (Persyn & Polson, 2012), adult learning has been integral in military
education, but it has always primarily focused on officer improvement. In 1978, the Department
of the Army conducted a review of their officer training programs and found they needed to
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incorporate adult learning principles such has having subject matter experts as the facilitators
who guided learners rather than taught them; needed more Socratic thinking questioning; and
more breakout groups to discuss material (Department of Army, 1978).
While the 1978 Army study found there were needed changes to the way instruction was
presented, the Skelton Panel in 1989 found the principles of adult learning needed to be better
implemented with more realistic problem-solving activities; independent research projects which
emphasized self-direction; and curriculum topics relevant to current events (Skelton Report,
1989). Although all these findings are pertinent to formal military training, they did not take into
consideration any enlisted training. It only focused on officers who only represent a fraction of
the active duty forces as well as veterans in the United States.
It was not until 2011 that the quality of the formal training for all ranks was investigated.
Beginning in 2011, the Army sought to overhaul their training program by first conducting a gap
analysis. From their research, the Army found they were not adequately adhering to the needs of
adult learning, particularly in enlisted training programs. As most of the blue collar workers are
former enlisted servicemen, (OPM, 2016) the way they were instructed makes a tremendous
difference in their thoughts towards formal education as well as what skills they already have.
One area the Army Learning Concept Manual (ALM) highlighted as a major deficiency
in adult learning was the lack of proficiency instructors had in the art of instructing. Anyone can
relate to the horror of sitting through a course with an with a monotone voice like Ben Stein from
the “Visine” commercials than instructing. Although the instructor may have been a technical
expert in their field, their ability to instruct is non-existent. The process to become an instructor
is as simple as the service member either requesting to go the specific location or the service
member being assigned orders to go there. There is no screening process in which the best
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candidates for instructing ability and technical expertise are selected; needs of the military
dictate a body needs to fill a billet.
The ALM (Department of the Army, 2015) also identified the onus of learning had been
placed on the instructor rather than the learner. The instructor was the center of learning while
students had little to no input on the material they were learning or the timeline in which they are
learning it. Having been a formal military instructor, there is no room to deviate from the
schedule as it is dictated from the highest echelons of leadership; instructors are required to
follow a prescribed training schedule with no deviations even if it is clear the learners are not
understanding material. In some cases, the Department of the Army or equivalent has to be
notified if any type of scheduling change is being made.
Based on Knowles’s (2012) idea of learners controlling their education, it is hard to
achieve this goal if learners have no ability to stop and rehash material in order to better
understand it. Learners must have some say in their learning or they take no personal interest in
it; under the previous Army system, the lack of learner involvement made it very difficult for
learners to take ownership of what they were learning.
Another thing the ALM (Department of the Army, 2015) found was learner experiences
were not taken into consideration when training was designed or presented. Knowles (2012)
firmly states the experiences of learners are what their future learning experiences are shaped
around. With the average age of a military member is 20 years old with the average civil servant
being 47 (OPM, 2016); the tremendous age gap and experience disparity likely creates different
motivating factors for members due to another principle of adult learning: accepting life
experience as resource of knowledge. Life experiences must be taken into consideration when
adult learning is to occur or otherwise the unmitigated risk of alienating the learner is present.
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Life experience allows the adult learner to relate to new material based on what they have
already experienced as well as how they relate it to what their future knowledge needs are
(Galbraith & Fouch, 2007). Without assuming life experiences, the question must be raised as to
how to create an environment for formal and informal training to take place which is neutral to
the majority of parties involved.
Research in adult education and military operations has not adequately provided feedback
as to how to bridge the gap of life experience and age difference in the military environment or
how to properly motivate organizational members with such broad differences in needs. The
ALM identified the need to better address life experiences in their curriculum but did not
indicate anything particular in terms of how to address age gaps and life experiences within
formal instruction (Department of the Army, 2015). As the federal government is the largest
employer in the United States (OPM, 2016), understanding the changing workforce is not only
applicable, it is pertinent to creating effective processes to better serve the American public
which retaining highly trained employees. General W. L. Creech, a veteran of the United States
Air Force with almost 40 years of experience argues it is up to the leaders of an organization to
recognize the needs and requirements of the mission and then develop their workforce to meet
them “by being attuned to the dynamics of human nature and providing the tools and incentives
that create focus and mobilize motivation,” (n.d., pg. 182).
A final theme the ALM (Department of the Army, 2015) found was the need to broaden
the methods of instruction. The study found the vast majority of presentations were static and
presented via PowerPoint. Learners were let with little practical application and were left to
listen to instructors lecture rather than to actively engage with the material. In order to move
away from the static presentations, the ALM has issued a mandate to limit PowerPoint

39

instruction and increase collaborative teams instead (Department of the Army, 2015). Learners
working together to construct knowledge and meaning of the new material based on their
collective experiences more successfully met the five principles of adult learning.
Involving organizational members in planning their learning based on their needs,
desires, and goals is another principle of Knowles’ which has been neglected in current literature.
Knowles (2012) argues adults must be actively involved in planning the learning outcomes and
processes of their education, but without a clear understanding of what universal goals and/or
needs are, it is difficult. The federal government has a large and diverse work force, but there
has been little published in the way of how training is accounted for such. Each organization
within DOD has required training all employees must complete each year, but it is up to the firstline supervisors to hold their employees accountable if installation leadership does not care. The
lack of emphasis placed on annual training can create a perception of training being unimportant
and not worth the effort. It is only at the installation level where training is monitored.
According to one human resources professional, if civil servant training is not important to the
current commanding general, the monitoring and enforcement of it goes to the wayside. The
lack of forthcoming data available creates a question as to how adult learning principles are
being incorporated into formal training as well as communicated to leaders for incorporation into
informal learning if there is no oversight on a departmental level of the programs (Black, Enslin,
& Hall-Baker, 2015).
No formal leadership or educational training is required of civil servants in supervisory
roles. Without an understanding of what motivates employees to work and work well for
leaders, it is hard to create an overarching environment of safety. Creating a cohesive
environment is difficult for leaders particularly when they have no experience in such. Creech
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(n.d.) expressed the need to use the adult learning principles, particularly reward and recognition,
when creating and maintaining a successful work force on a military installation. He argued it
was fundamental to the process to measure performance because without knowing how they
were doing, employees had no definitive concept of what they were doing. Measuring made
performance tangible and leaders needed to reward and recognize those who were doing well.
Creech’s view is conducive to Knowles’ motivations in adult learning: motivation is key and
without being properly motivated, employees will not learn or engage information.
Motivation. Motivation comes in different types with the two primary being intrinsic
and extrinsic (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Intrinsic motivation is doing something for the inherent
value or pleasure it will bring; extrinsic motivation is doing something for the tangible or
external reward it will bring. Essentially, a learner who is intrinsically motivated to learn about
workplace safety wants to learn to better the workplace and their personal knowledge. An
extrinsically motivated learner learns about the same topic so they can have one more
qualification for the leadership position they are applying to (Ryan & Deci, 2000). The
difference is distinct and important for a leader to distinguish in order to successfully motivate
stakeholders.
An often unfortunate reason people are sent to training in the military is to fill a quota or
to check the box on a requirement. Every organization is allowed a specific number of slots in
any given training and there are times when no one within the organization has an immediate
need for the training. Instead of passing the seat in the training onto another organization,
leaders select someone to fill the seat. If the training is refused, military and civilian stakeholders
face punitive actions which will detrimentally impact their careers. Leaders often fail to look at
the current circumstances and readiness of the stakeholder which would likely impact their
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ability to learn. Understanding the whole person and what mental state of readiness an employee
is in must be taken into account before training is to occur or barriers to learn will be created
(Baker, et. al., 2016).
Leaders can create barriers to learning by not recognizing a person who is too stressed or
uninterested to learn. The stakeholders are attending the training and are extrinsically motivated
to do so as they are in fear of losing their careers. Stakeholders who are overly controlled learn
less, lose the initiative to learn, and display difficulty learning complex situations (Ryan & Deci,
2000). The optimum time to send them to training would require their leaders to be actively
engaged in understanding the stakeholders and their mental readiness (Baker, et. al., 2016).
When a follower is mentally prepared with minimal distractions, they can be intrinsically
motivated to learn new material as they are interested, but can also see how it will positively
impact their lives.
The challenge for leaders is to understand what motivates each stakeholder and create
rewards for them. A universal reward is a monetary one. Adults enjoy getting extra money and
can always find a way to use it, but it is extrinsic and does not encourage learning knowledge to
better the organization. Monetary awards encourage adults to learn something for the time
being, but are often one-time occurrences so determining whether the leaner has changed his or
her behavior permanently is difficult. For this reason, OSHA does not allow an organization in
Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) to give out monetary awards for safe behavior (Bennett &
Deitch, 2007). Organizations are each challenged to collaborate on rewards which are not based
on a monetary value.
Little research other than Creech (n.d.) has been conducted on specific motivators which
are not monetary based, creating a gap in literature. It should always be the goal of any leader to
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grow an employee from being extrinsically motivated, wanting a tangible reward for doing the
right thing to an employee who is intrinsically motivated, seeking to do the right thing simply
because it is the right thing. The challenge is to know the employees and what makes each
individual tick.
Kim and Merriam (2004) state that as adults age, they become increasingly motivated by
the internal desire to do something rather than a tangible reward. Gom (2009) agrees and argues
the turn towards intrinsic motivation is due to maturity. What research does not indicate is if
environmental factors contribute to the success or failure of maturing adults to become
intrinsically motivated. It must be questioned whether working adults are extrinsically motivated
as they are still in the workplace while retired adults have no requirements on learning thus they
are able to learn what they enjoy.
In 2007, a study was conducted by Bessette to determine what the best motivators were
for adults working in high hazard areas to wear ear protection. She found simply to comply with
regulations or to please leadership were not viable reasons for compliance. Effective training had
to be conducted which demonstrated how each and every employee was a stakeholder in their
own hearing prevention program in order for compliance to increase. It took training to be
designed to fit the specific population both on and off the job in order to successfully motivate
employees to wear their ear protection. Essentially, the organization had to successfully
motivate employees to become stakeholders in their own future by demonstrating they cared
about the stakeholders inside and outside of work.
Bessette’s research (2007) highlights the need for effective training to successfully share
the message with stakeholders to become motivated for the organizational cause. What research
does not indicate is how military organizations do this; how well designed are military trainings
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and how well presented are they? Civilian organizations can hire and fire trainers and product
developers based on their performance, but military organizations have significant barriers to
their human resources which allows for lackluster employees to continue in their positions
without preventing an impact on the learners. A gap in research needs to be filled in whether the
military has an effective training program and whether it has any impact on the motivation of
stakeholders to learn required information.
Leadership Styles
While motivation is something which can be led by either the individual or the leader,
leadership is something the employee cannot control. Leadership is conceptualized by Peter
Northouse (2012) as a process where one individual influences a group of people to achieve a
common goal or mission. It is crucial to any organization or mission to have a leader as the
leader is the one who can create a shared vision and motivate employees to achieve the mission.
Leaders in the military are predominantly autocratic according to Yeakey (2002). As
approximately more than half of civilian workers for the DOD are veterans, the autocratic
leadership style is likely the most common as well. Autocratic leaders are those who force their
will onto their followers and create an environment where fear is more prevalent than good will.
Unique to the military is the ability to legally punish members who do not adhere to the will of
their leaders; if regular sanctions of reprimand and counseling do not work military leaders are
able to imprison their members in most severe cases.
Leaders in the military are appointed, not elected. Leaders are granted their authority
based on having a minimum of 1100 on the SATs and a bachelor’s degree from an accredited
university. Thrust into a position of leadership based on such minimal qualifications creates an
environment where autocratic leadership traits are instinctual to implement. For enlisted
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personnel, they often develop autocratic tendencies due to their constant exposure to officer
leadership, thus creating a never-ending cycle of poor leadership (Lathers, 2012).
Creech (n.d.) explains the tendency towards autocratic leadership stems from World War
II and earlier where class systems were still more in place than today. It allowed for results to be
achieved, but in today’s society where people have more opportunities and drive, they are less
responsive to dictation. The results create an environment where people are closed off and
unwilling to think outside of the norm. Creech describes the type of leader as someone who
terrorizes the organization and utilizes intimidation as a motivation.
With the idea of autocratic leadership being prevalent in the military, the notion of other
leadership styles being more suited to a safety environment is important. Situational leadership
(Yeakey, 2002) and transformational leadership (Bass, B. & Avolio, B., 1995) are two styles
which embrace being flexible to meet the needs of the followers rather than meeting the needs of
the leaders. Understanding these two types of leadership styles and how they may or may not
impact the workplace safety of a military installation could perhaps shed more light on the issue.
Situational leadership. Yeakey’s (2002) article argues leaders across the military need
to develop their situational leadership abilities to better suit the needs of their organizations.
Situational leadership is the idea of a leader adjusting their leadership style to fit the needs of his
or her members individually (Hersey & Blanchard, 1998). Members can fall in four dimensions
ranging from being a novice and requiring intense oversight by the leader to being experts and
needing only acknowledgment from leaders. Quantifying this for the military, each leader needs
to know exactly what guidance and oversight they need to provide individual followers, thus
developing a more empowered organization ready to combat an ever-changing battlefield.
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A leader must be flexible in order to meet the changing needs of the battlefield. As AlQaeda has changed the way battles are fought, a leader must be flexible in their ability to lead
their stakeholders while also adjust to the social influences surrounding them. A balance must be
struck or stakeholders and the community will suffer. When a leader is not actively engaged
with stakeholders and does not know their individual needs, dire situations can occur. Williams
(2009) highlights the Abu Ghraib situation as a glaring example of uncontrolled innovative
behavior in modern times. Rules of engagement, set in place based on the Geneva Convention,
were constructed to ensure prisoners of war were not mistreated. However, the rules of
engagement were perceived as obstacles to a noble outcome as the prisoners at Abu Ghraib were
viewed as terrorists who killed Americans, thus the control systems set in place were
circumvented. Williams’s statement highlights the need for leaders to actively engage in
situational leadership and not assume anything about their stakeholders. Without an in-depth
knowledge of what needs the stakeholders have, a leader risks demeaning them by
micromanaging them or giving them too much freedom when they need more micromanaging.
When fully instituted, situational leadership for the military would create an environment
much like the one described in Pater’s (2012) article where employees are willing to act
immediately to remedy unsafe situations because leaders are able to shift their leadership styles
to meet the needs of their subordinates at any given time. Immediate behavior from empowered
members is critical to staying alive in inherently dangerous situations. Regardless of whether
stakeholders are fighting insurgents in Iraq or working on traffic lights on an American base,
they must be stakeholders and feel as if they are valuable to the organization (Baker, et. al.,
2016).
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A difficult issue military organizations encounter with organizational stake holding is
they are led from a distance based on the chain of command extending all the way to the
President of the United States of America (POTUS). Although leaders at all levels have the
ability to make lasting changes, senior leaders at the executive level of the federal government
(POTUS and respective defense secretaries) often make decisions impacting all levels of military
organizations with little understanding as to how those decisions will impact the lowest levels of
the organization. Anytime a politic scandal arises, executive leaders make immediate decisions
to appease political grumblings. However, they do not have the full picture of how widespread
the issue is or is not. An example would be the recent uproar over sexual assaults in the military.
The media portrayed active duty females being systemically raped and abused by their male
counterparts so all DOD employees, military and civilian, were required to take three iterations
of sexual assault prevention training according to one human resources professional.
Leaders were so far removed from the lowest level of the organization, they had no idea
whether there was an actual issue with sexual assault; they acted to quell a scandal. In doing so,
they made decisions which wasted millions of dollars in wasted man hours as employees were
forced to sit through three separate trainings to cover the same topic. Leaders at the top were so
far out of touch with their stakeholders they failed to truly grasp the problem or adequately
address it. Situational leadership would have rectified this as the units or larger military
organizations with the issue could have been trained or whatever course of action deemed
necessary to correct the problem, while the rest of the military would not have stopped the
operational tempo to learn about sexual assault in three different classes. I can remember having
to sit through three different classes which all covered the same topic about how to not sexually
assault your co-workers. What was frustrating was the vast majority of the cases were happening
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in military academies (similar to colleges) and not actually in the actual warfighting military
units. Connaughton, Shuffler, and Goodwin (2011) highlight the difficulties associated with
leading from a distance with the only solution to be clear, concise communication starting at the
top. The problem with military organizations is when something is issues from the executive
levels near the POTUS, there is often not a true understanding of what the lowest levels—the
boots on the ground—perceive as a problem. With thousands of leaders between POTUS and
the new enlisted guy, there is no communication to truly understand the issue at hand.
Blair (2013) describes a successful leader as a person who actively engages with
employees. “Leadership by walking around” is his term for leaders who visit the machine shops
full of blue-collar workers, the water treatment plants who are continuously manned, and all the
other offices where employees generally are hidden from public view. Such leaders have the
opportunity to learn about what the entire organization does while demonstrating a genuine
interest in their employees which is far superior to reading statistics behind a computer (Blair,
2013). In the case of all military organizations, senior leaders have the rely on their lower level
supervisors to report what the conditions are on the ground, thus allowing senior leaders to make
decisions. However, Blair (2013) argues if senior leaders engage in “leadership by walking
around”, they will model the behavior they want of their leaders which is to actually go into the
shops and gain an understanding of what the lowest level employees think, feel, need, and want
from the organization so they can better do their jobs.
Employees who witness “leadership by walking around” begin to develop trust in their
leaders as they see the leaders are demonstrating they care about what their employees do. One
of the best things a leader can do on these walking around tours is genuinely listen to what the
employees are saying. Often, employees have outstanding suggestions on how to improve
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processes or questions which highlight serious needs. When leaders listen to what employees
have to say, employees feel as if they actually have voice in the organization and further become
stakeholders in it (Baker, et. al., 2016). Situational leadership enhances this principle as leaders
can shift their leadership style to meet the needs of individual shops who each have different
missions, thus different needs from their leaders.
Forck (2012) describes the need for employees to feel as though their actions as
individuals are pertinent to the success of the organization. In a positive safety culture or a
culture where safety is paramount and practiced in every aspect of the workday, every
stakeholder is just that: a stakeholder. Their actions can and will keep their fellow stakeholders
safe, but without being empowered by leadership, the stakeholders revert back to employees who
are unwilling to innovate (Forck, 2012). Leaders are the driving force behind creating an
organizational culture to embrace safety as well as morale; without leaders engaging and
encouraging the stakeholders of the organization, the ability to safely carryout the mission is
called into question.
Organizations in which employees have become stakeholders were created based on the
trust employees have in their leadership. Ugwu, Onyishi, and Rodriguez-Sanchez (2014) found
employees who were empowered by their leaders in the workplace were able to overcome
barriers to their performance which had the potential to decrease their productivity or value to
the organization such as making safe choices and wanting to learn how to better their
organization. By being empowered to carry out their tasks with little oversight and being able to
make decisions which directly impacted the organization, employees felt more confident in their
value to the organization which directly reflects the final step of Yeakey’s (2002) situation
leadership where employees needed little supervision. Ugwu et al. (2014) argues employees who
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were psychologically empowered by their leaders were able to overcome personal barriers at
work due to their ability to alter their methods or course of work. They had the ability to
prioritize and rearrange their duties to accommodate their personal needs while still
accomplishing their tasks for the organization. Such flexibility and freedom gave the employees
the sense of value to the organization and trust in their leaders (Baker, et. al., 2016). It also
furthers situational leadership as employees were able to still achieve the organizational mission
while taking care of their personal needs since they were empowered by leadership to prioritize
task importance based on how the employees viewed them.
Leaders should know their employees and strive to create a culture of a team based on the
theory of situational leadership (Yeakey, 2002). Such an encompassing knowledge of the needs
of the team and individuals of the team allow leaders to foster loyalty and trust. Winn (2014)
urges leaders to help organizations bond and maintain unit cohesion. Cohesive units experience
and are less susceptible to the influence of negative sources. Further, Winn argues leaders must
demonstrate commitment to the unit by integrating people into the team and giving them roles as
well as a sense of control to act within their mission. Leaders who know what their teams and
employees are capable of are better able to achieve success in the organizational mission.
Leaders know the strengths and weaknesses of members and can better leverage their resources
towards success. In a military environment, knowing who is flexible and can contort themselves
into a boiler versus who can hold up heavy tools for the mechanic allows a leadership to better
direct resources. More importantly, when leaders are able to develop a team mentality,
stakeholders can engage in self-determination and self-efficacy (Baker, et. al., 2016).
It is apparent a leader must actively engage with employees in order to be successful
(Baker, et. al., 2016). Employee perceptions of leadership are more important than facts as each
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person creates their own version of reality based on their experiences. If leaders are removed
from their employees, it is difficult for employees to perceive much other than they are not
important by the lack of interaction they have with leadership.
Transformational leadership. A secondary effect of situational leadership is
transformational leadership. A process in which leaders and followers raise morality and
motivation to the highest levels is how Burns (1978) defined transformational leadership. If
situational leaders empower members of an organization to become independent,
transformational leadership will encourage them to remain that way. Having a secondary avenue
utilized to ensure leaders are encouraging their members on appropriate levels is nothing but a
benefit to any organization, including the military.
Transformational leadership encourages organizational members to reach for the
seemingly impossible and sets high expectations through clear goals, high expectations, and
modeling integrity and fairness (Bass, 1985). Such outcomes are in line with the desired
outcomes of situational leadership to grow independent, confident members of an organization.
Combining the two leadership styles would not hinder the military and her work force, but
enhance it through similar styles designed to target each member of the organization. With any
organization, the more confident the members in their organization, the better quality product
they will produce.
Forck (2012) indicates leaders are the foundation for creating a change within the
organization. Jeffrey Zacharakis and Jay Van Der Werff (2012) hold adults learn tremendously
through the interactions, both social and imitation, with those around them which creates the
need for leaders to model the desired behavior. Leaders not only need to model the behavior, but
they need to create an environment where the behavior is expected and morale is high. Creech
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(n.d.) and Yeakey (2002) identified the need for leaders to be adaptive and engaging with all the
stakeholders to create loyalty and buy-in for the organization. Without leaders who work to meet
the needs of the employees, an environment of unsafe behavior will likely result (Pater, 2012).
Emotional Intelligence
Emotional intelligence is defined as the ability to perceive emotions, access and leverage
emotions to help with thinking, to understand the emotions of others, and to regulate the
emotions to promote intellectual development (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Plainly put, emotional
intelligence is the ability to recognize personal emotions, and the emotions of others, and using
them as a source of influence to motivate others. When emotions are accurately reflected or
acknowledged in decision making, the chances of employees following are much better
(Goleman, 1998).
The connection between emotion and intelligence was first identified by Plato when he
posited all learning was based in some form or fashion on emotion, but did not gain much
traction until the 20th century. Edward Thorndike wrote about social intelligence in the 1920s
and defined it was the ability to understand and wisely manage humans. Abraham Maslow’s
work in the 1950’s argued there were a variety of different types of intelligence, including
emotional intelligence. Howard Gardner (1983) took the lead in the 1980s when he pushed the
idea of emotional intelligence under the idea of multiple intelligences. He believed intrapersonal
and interpersonal intelligences were equally as important as traditionally viewed intelligence as
they guided how to interact with people. Interpersonal intelligence, according to Gardner (1983)
was the capacity to comprehend the intentions, motivations, and desires of others. In contrast,
intrapersonal intelligence was the ability to understand oneself; to appreciate personal fears,
motivations, and feelings.
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It was not until 1990 when John Mayer and Peter Salvoey wrote the first article which
articulated emotional intelligence as we now know it. They posited emotional intelligence was
an ability rather than a trait. As an ability, emotional intelligence allows people to navigate
social environments and develop adaptive behaviors needed to survive or flourish. Each
individual’s emotional intelligence ability is on a spectrum, thus most people have some form of
emotional intelligence, but the further right of the median, the more emotionally intelligent a
person is.
Based on the assumption of emotional intelligence being an assumption, Mayer and
Salvoey (1990) posited there were four basic assumptions. Perceiving emotions was the ability
to recognize and decipher emotions visually, as in pictures and faces, while also being able to
recognize emotion in voices. Understanding emotions was the second ability it and it held a
person needed to be able to appreciate the complicated relationships amongst emotions. Further,
people who could understand the relationship between how emotions could spawn secondary and
tertiary emotions would be high in the ability to understand emotions. The final two assumptions
of emotional intelligence as an ability were to use emotions and manage emotions. Using
emotions was the ability to leverage emotions of others to solve problems while managing
emotions was the ability to regulate emotions of oneself and others around them.
To measure emotional intelligence, the Mayer-Salovey-Caurso Emotional Intelligence
(MSCEIT) was developed based on a series of emotion based problem solving questions. The
primary goal of the MSCEIT is to determine the test taker’s abilities in each of the four outlined
abilities. Each ability is scored, while an overall score is assessed as well. In order to determine
the numerical value of each score, the answers are compared to those who have taken the
MSCEIT worldwide. The higher the score in each ability, the stronger the individual is. The
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major drawback to this type of scoring is the lack of objective base. The scores are just a sample
of the population which the person is being compared against and could potentially be in
accurate. Further, the questions determine if the test taker knows how to behave in emotional
situations, but does not determine if the person will actually behave that way (Brody, 2004).
In contrast to the abilities model, the trait model of emotional intelligence was proposed
by Petrides, (2000) and defined emotional intelligence as emotional self-perceptions found in the
lower levels of personality. They based their trait model on each individual’s perceptions of his
or her emotional abilities. To measure emotional intelligence, Petrides, et. al. (2000) proposed a
self-report inventory called the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire (TEIQue). Four
factors were considered: well-being; self-control; emotionality; and sociability. Of these four
factors, fifteen sub factors were included and found to be globally normal with high reliability.
Daniel Goleman, considered to be one of the forefront scholars in emotional intelligence,
proposed a mixed models approach to measuring emotional intelligence. In 1995, he was the
first to publish a book on emotional intelligence, but more importantly he was the first to really
bring the concept to the forefront of leadership and organizational scholarship. He proposed the
idea of emotional intelligence answering the complexities of human interactions with other
humans. According to Goleman (1995) when leaders understand their own emotions and how to
control them, they can help to regulate employees’ emotions to better meet the needs of the
organization. He further posited people are born with general emotional awareness which
determines their ability to learn and develop emotional competencies. The competencies are
learned through experiences and must constantly be developed as the environment is constantly
changing to meet the needs of society.
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The two major competencies Goleman (1995) stressed in his model were personal
competence and social competence. Within the personal competence, Goleman stressed selfawareness, as in knowing one’s strengths and weaknesses as well as how personal emotions
impact them; self-regulation, or the ability to control one’s emotions and adapt to changing
environments; and motivation or recognizing the different types and applications of motivation
to achieve a common goal. Goleman’s (1995) social competence stressed empathy, the ability to
understand how and why someone else is feeling the way they are; and social skills, or the ability
to navigate personal relationships. He stressed these core competencies were vital to being
successful in leveraging emotional intelligence.
Measuring emotional intelligence under Goleman’s model is done primarily through the
Emotional and Social Competency Inventory (ESCI) he developed with Boyatzis. The ESCI
looks at twelve different competencies and has an outside rater review the results of a self-report
assessment. It differs from other measurement tools by having the results compared to what the
statistics on each question as well as the way the rater interprets the responses. Further, it is
based more on the traits a person has rather than how the individual believes he or she will
respond in a given situation.
Even though there are a variety of tools to measure emotional intelligence, it is still not
fully accepted by all academics. Eysenck (2000) likens emotional intelligence to quicksand and
having no scientific basis; he argues it is absurd to even believe the fundamental abilities all
humans are being defined as any form of intelligence. Locke (2005) furthers Eysenck’s position
by arguing emotional intelligence is nothing more than a skill people have or do not have; some
people may have the skill while others may have the skill of writing, speaking in public, or being
a mechanic.
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Emotional Intelligence in the Military
On the battlefield, leaders are required to make life and death decisions in highly volatile
and stressful situations. When the leaders are high in emotional intelligence, they are more
successful in inspiring troops to be creative in problem solving, motivated to complete the
mission, and the organization generally has a higher morale (George, 2000; Bass & Yammarino,
1998). The battlefield requires creativity in problem solving as the enemy is often engaging in
unconventional warfare, meaning they use the public as a weapon for their cause rather than fight
a traditionally with guns and bombs. Due to the change in the way war is being conducted,
particularly in the Middle East, leaders have to win the hearts and minds of the public in order to
prevent them from being pawns of the enemy. The only way to do this is through leadership in
emotional intelligence.
Goleman (2006) argues emotionally intelligent leaders are not narcissists; they are not
leaders who lead through the do-as-I-say, not-as-I-do which creates a very negative environment.
They are not leaders who belittle, reprimand, or punish in private. Rather, emotionally
intelligent leaders are the ones who take the employees’ feelings into consideration when making
a decision, as well as use mistakes as learning opportunities (Goleman, 2006). On the battlefield,
the need for a leader who can make life and death situations is real; how the need for a leader
who can empathize, and leverage emotions of a conquered people is also real. Thus, the need for
a leader extremely high in emotional intelligence while on the battlefield is almost a necessity.
In garrison, emotional intelligence is just as important; it impacts every aspect of
organizational effectiveness (Cherniss, 2000). In a military organization, leaders are forced to
make decisions based on the stringent requirements set forth by higher headquarters personnel
who have no idea what each organization does on a micro level. With dozens of layers of
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bureaucracy between the policy setters and the people carrying out the mission, military leaders
are faced with limited resources and policies which are unreasonable for their organization.
Employees can be left dissatisfied and feeling as if the mission is not accomplishable; in short,
employees are demotivated as they cannot effectively complete their tasks given the
requirements placed on them. However, leaders who are high in emotional intelligence are able
to motivate employees to see the positive side of the situation (George, 2000).
Emotionally intelligent leaders use their personal experiences, and the emotions
associated with them, to better motivate the employees. By internally reflecting on how specific
experiences impacts them, leaders are better able to understand how and why employees react to
situations. As Knowles (2012) posited, experiences create a prior knowledge on a situation. The
knowledge gained from the experience creates a preconceived way adults will react in similar
situations. Leaders high in emotional intelligence will use this information and leverage it to
their advantage by creating some motivational factor for it. Research has found emotionally
intelligent leaders are able to influence the motivations of the employees to become positive if
they are dissatisfied or discouraged within the organization (Zipkin, 2000). However, applying
this to a military organization has yet to be done which provides an opportunity for research to
be conducted during this case study.
Bass and Avolio (1994) posit an emotionally intelligent leader is one who focuses on the
needs and goals of their employees as well as the overarching needs of the organization. In a
military environment, it may be difficult to quantify the overarching goals and needs of an
organization as there are so many layers of bureaucracy. However, in the case study proposed,
applying the goals and mission of the local organization may present a more definite picture of
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how emotionally intelligent leaders are able to balance the needs of both employees and the
organization.
Emotional intelligence is the one theory where all the unique considerations of a military
environment and military leadership are taken into consideration. Through understanding the
use of emotional intelligence and how it impacts the military environment, it is possible the role
leadership plays in workplace safety can be understood through the lens of leaders understanding
the motivation and mentality of employees. If the leaders understood why and how employees
developed their emotions towards workplace safety and the overall organization, it is easier to
understand what and how to fix it.
Chapter Summary
More research is needed to understand and conceptualize how military experience
impacts the perception of safety in the workplace for veterans. The literature indicates
employees who feel as if their opinions and feelings are valued, are more likely to become
stakeholders in the organization, thus creating an environment where they have a high morale as
well as a high regard for the requirements they are to adhere to. Leaders who actively engage
with their employees and listen to what the employees have to say, are likely to have a higher
emotional intelligence which is what literature indicates as one of the best forms of leadership.
However, little research exists as to how emotional intelligence works in the military, as the
unique requirements of military decision making cannot be easily recreated in the civilian sector.
However, through this case study, it is hoped some headway will be made.
Further, research is needed to determine how much senior leadership impacts workplace
safety on a military installation as much research has focused largely on how leadership overall,
impacts workplace safety. Understanding if different levels of leadership are more important, or
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impact safety more acutely will help to understand what nuances military installations have no
only on their active duty members, but how their civilians view leadership and safety.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative case study is to understand how senior leaders impact
workplace safety on a military installation and how prior military experience impacts employee
perception of workplace safety in a military environment. The research questions directing this
study were:
1. How do senior leaders impact workplace safety in a military work environment?
2. How does military experience impact employee perception of workplace safety in a
military work environment?
This chapter describes the qualitative research design of this study, the rationale for choosing the
participants, the methodology, assumptions for this case study, the data collection tools, the
methods of analyzing, and indicators of data quality.
Research Design
Qualitative research is defined by Immy Holloway (1997) as social inquiry focusing on
the way people make sense of their experiences in the world around them. Holloway (1997)
further asserts there are a variety of approaches to social inquiry with the aim to understand the
social reality of individuals, groups, and cultures. Qualitative approaches are used for social
inquiry to better understand the perspectives, experiences, and behaviors of the people they
study. Case study was the research approach chosen to better understand how senior leaders and
prior military experience impact workplace safety. Qualitative research seeks to understand the
experiences of the people living them and a case study allows a researcher to study an experience
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as a snapshot in time. The snapshot in time allows the researcher to understand the specific
environment and situation at the given time in regards to how safety and leadership impacted in a
military environment for prior service employees.
Creswell (2011) describes a qualitative case study as situating a research in the world as
an observer. From there, the researcher seeks to understand specific events, making sense of
them, as they occur (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Further, Denzin and Lincoln (2011) argue
qualitative research is understanding the world in a natural setting. Creswell (2012) adds to
Denzin and Lincoln (2011) by asserting that the voice of the study participants must be heard
within the research.
The purpose of a case study is to represent a specific snapshot in time and the people who
were involved in it (Stake, 1995). According to Holton and Swanson (2005), a case study is a
viable means of inquiry to better understand a particular phenomenon at a current time. Case
studies allow “investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life
events,” (Yin, 2008, p. 4). Brown (2006) posits exploratory research seeks to shed light on
situations where little to no data is available for. A single case study’s main objective is to
improve the knowledge of a topic. Combining these two goals, for this research, an exploratory
single case study was selected and designed to look at employees across a large military
installation and interview them to better understand how they view leadership and workplace
safety.
Employee interviews will be the primary source of data for this exploratory case study
and will be augmented by secondary sources such as historical accident rates and trends.
Workplace observation and artifact collection will also be utilized to develop a holistic view of
the phenomenon.
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Study Context and Setting
The setting for this research is a large military installation in the United States, housing
over 60,000 federal employees, both military and civilian. It is one of the premier training bases
for combat warfare in the world and frequently hosts militaries from other nations for training.
The installation’s accident rate for the last 18 years has been 6.7 accidents per 200,000 man
hours worked, which is almost the double the national average for comparable industry of 3.5.
The rate is a mathematical formula calculated from multiplying the number of accidents by
200,000 and then dividing the product by the total number of hours worked by employees on the
installation. The installation is unique as it is one of the largest military training bases in the
nation based on square miles as well as the number of training operations it undergoes each year
and encompasses international forces who regularly train. Additionally, it is unique because of
how high their accident rate is; the high accident rate has actually caused it to be one of the top
ten biggest payers of workers compensation claims. It cannot be named due to confidentiality
and privacy reasons. Utilizing this installation for the case study brings a dynamic pool of
participants and variety of occupational fields to choose from which allows for a wide array of
personal experiences.
The employees who make up the installation’s civilian workforce work in a wide range of
activities from tank and combat vehicle maintenance to facilities maintenance. Armorers and
explosive ordnance professionals are housed on the installation as well. Administrative
functions also have civilian components, with all occupations serving with military and civilian
components working together. As the installation is remotely located, the majority of civilian
employees have retired from active duty military service and returned to the installation as civil
service which is evidenced by the high number of veterans serving in the workforce.
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At a macro-level, the DOD is a structure with several layers between the Secretary of
Defense and the lowest level workers, such as this study’s participants.

Figure 1. Macro-level overview of the DOD structure starting from the Secretary of Defense

From the DOD level down to each installation level, there are literally dozens if not
hundreds of leaders in between. For the particular installation in question, the Commanding
General is the most senior leader, followed by the leadership at each staff level, referred to as
“G4” in the following chart. From the G4 level there is an assistant chief of staff as well as a
deputy assistant chief of staff. Below the G4 level, Unit 4 has a commanding officer and deputy
commanding officer as well as five shops which all report to a supervisor who reports to the
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maintenance officer. Each shop also has a shop supervisor. For this particular case study, senior
leader ship is referred to as the Commanding General and G4 leadership with middle
management referred to as the commanding officer and deputy commanding officer of Unit 4.
Figure 2. Overview of the chain of command at the research site

Population
The population for this study will consist of over 60,000 people on a large military
installation in the United States. Predominately males with a high school education, there are
also a range of education levels all the way to terminal degrees on the installation. Most
employees are blue collar workers with most white-collar workers being in senior leadership
positions. It is difficult to give a specific number of employees as the number fluctuates on a
daily basis. The fluctuation is due in part to troop movements which is classified information.
Due to troop movements and that the exact number of people involved in them is classified, only
generalizations on the amount of personnel on the installation at any given time are available.
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Approximately 20,000 people live on the installation in government provided housing with their
families. Educational opportunities range from elementary school to master’s programs in the
way of formal education while there are daily opportunities for informal training through on-thejob training.
Participants Selected
The 20 participants were purposefully sampled from a pool of all employees who were in
a high hazard job and were not in supervisory or leadership roles. Employees selected had to
meet the following criteria: 1. Work in a blue-collar environment; 2. Hold a non-supervisory
role; 3. Willing to participate. Veteran status was not a criterion for participating in the study; the
fact only one non-veteran was selected to participant in the study indicates how high the
concentration of veterans was for the organization studied. It was not the intent of the research
to compare veteran and non-veteran employees, rather it was focused on workplace safety for all
employee. Purposeful sampling is described by Merriam (1998) as intentional sampling when the
investigator selects participants who the most information can be obtained from. The additional
criteria for selecting participants were as follows:
1. Must be an employee of the specific installation and not a tenant command.
2. Must be willing to participate.
3. Must be a civil servant of the Appropriated Funds pool
4. Must have worked at least three years at the specific installation
The rationale for selection of the first criterion was to ensure they were members of the
organization in the case study. As there are several tenant commands and members of the public
who frequent the installation, ensuring the participants were part of the target population is
paramount to collect accurate data.
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The second criterion was required simply as a means to ensure no individual was coerced
into participation. Unwilling participation could potentially create fear or apprehension towards
truthfully answering research questions. If answers are not honest, the potential for errors would
be much higher, but more importantly the credibility of the research findings. If people are
forced into participating it is not difficult to believe they would speak derogatorily about it with
their peers, eventually leading to an assumption on the installation of the study being poorly
conducted or having inaccurate results.
Employees who are paid through appropriated funds are employees whose wages are paid
through Congressional approval; essentially, Congress has set aside the money for each of the
jobs each year. This differs from non-appropriated funds positions which are funded through the
earning of money through the selling of goods on a military installation like at the Exchange
(think of it as a mall). The appropriated funds positions are extremely hard to terminate as they
have been funded through multiple years. The reason those types of positions were selected was
because the employees have little to no fear of being terminated if they say something which
may anger leadership should they find out.
The fourth criterion for selection was employees must have worked for at least three
years on the installation. Every two years new leadership takes over in the form of an
Installation Sergeant Major and Installation Commanding General, thus employees who have
worked on the installation for at least three years have worked for two sets of leadership for at
least a year a piece. I feel it is important the employees have experience with their positions, but
also with different leaders to ensure they can compare how they are impacted by the different
types of leadership.
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As the goal of the study was to determine how leadership impacts safety, participants
who were in the most high-hazard occupations were the desired target population as they had a
higher risk of being injured on the job. Of the employees who worked in high-hazard
occupations, all were blue-collar workers except the active duty military which narrowed the
target population down to approximately 300 employees. Specific participants were identified
on roster with all other employees who met the required criteria. The names were put into a
random selection generator online which randomly selected them. Employees were contacted inperson where the study was explained to them and their consent to participate was verbally
requested. If the employee consented, he or she signed a consent form.
Name

Male

Female

Veteran

X

X
X
X

4
8
4
8
25
4
21

5-10
15-20
10-15
10-15

27
10
0
X
4
X
22
X
4
X
4
X
4
X
4
X
4
X
8
X
4
Table 2. Demographics

20-25
15-20
15-20
20-25
5-10
5-10
10-15
20-25
15-20
20-25
10-15
5-10

John
Monique
Will

X

Jim
Chuck
Omar
Timmy

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

Kris
Jack
Jose
LaMonte
Andy
Harold
Dean
Mark
Tom
Chester
Donnie
Matt

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X

Years
Military
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Years
Civilian
10-15
0-5
25-30

Occupation
HVAC
HVAC
High Voltage
Electrician
GIS
Quality Assurance
HVAC
High Voltage
Electrician
Quality Assurance
HVAC
Quality Assurance
Mechanic
Mechanic
Mechanic
Plumbing
Locksmith
Plumbing
Machinist
Plumbing
Heavy Equipment

Data Collected
Merriam (1998), identified that for an exploratory case study, it is imperative to gather
“as much information as possible with the intent of interpreting or theorizing about the
phenomenon” (p. 38). She further discussed the need to use multiple approaches to gather data
to create an “intensive, holistic description and analysis” (p. xiii) using the following methods:
interviews and analyzing documents. The data collection process is aimed to provide depth to
the material as well as be a reoccurring process to ensure results are accurate in the study.
Data collection consisted of one interview with each of the 20 participants, two document
reviews, an analysis of accident rate data, and observations. Through the multiple iterations of
data collection through interviews and observations, and different types of data collection
methods, triangulation was achieved. Triangulation is the process Merriam (1998) describes as a
way to cross-check findings through multiple data sources. It is a means to increase validity of
results by verifying results of from one source with other, independent sources.
During interviews, field notes were taken and transcribed afterwards. Data was collected
and hard copies of any material stored in a locked cabinet within a locked office. The
transcribed data was kept on a secure, password-protected server to ensure data was not
inadvertently be shared with parties outside of the research process. Transcripts were sent to all
interviewees for their review in the event they feel their intent was not conveyed correctly or
they want to add something else, also referred to as member checking.
Interviews. Structured interviews were conducted in the participant’s office with the
participant and researcher. Interviews were structured in a question and answer format with the
goal of assisting the researcher in finding answers which could not be observed or analyzed via a
document review. Each interview was approximately thirty minutes and each participant was
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interviewed only once for a total of 20 interviews. The interviews (see Appendix A) focused on
ten main questions of how participants viewed their workplace, their personal safety, and the
way they believed their leadership impacted their personal safety.
All sessions were recorded with the consent of the participant. In this case study, it was
imperative to understand the background experiences and associated impact of leadership unique
to each participant. Periodically, the researcher would verbally articulate what they heard the
interviewee say in order to ensure accuracy. After the interview was concluded, the researcher
transcribed it and then provided the transcript to the interviewee for review. The purpose was to
allow them to ensure that their thoughts and experiences were accurately captured as well as to
allow them to make any additional comments they felt were needed to clarify their interviews.
Artifact collection. Yin (2003) described artifact collection as a piece of “physical
evidence” which has some type of cultural or physical significance to the research. Merriam
(1998) argued researchers must be able to think creatively and critically to identify what
documents and artifacts are pertinent to the study. For this specific study, historical data and
current data on comparable general industry safety records as well as the specific installation was
collected from the Occupational Safety Department. The information provided data on mishap
trends and whether accident rates had altered since an increased awareness was placed on safety
by leadership. These records were artifacts in themselves as they provided historical data on
how the mishap rate of the installation was calculated. The data within them was reviewed and
compared to the Command Chronology, which was a living history the installation required all
organizations and tenant commands to annually update with specific milestones—positive and
negative—for every month of the year. The two documents were compared to each other to
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determine if a specific organization had a major event which corresponded to a shift in accident
rates to potentially identify if there was a known event causing accidents.
Notes were taken on the safety documents, including mishap reports and mishap data
provided by Occupational Safety Department since the documents could not be removed from
the office due to privacy regulations. Notes were taken based on what types of accidents were
occurring most frequently, which accidents would have been preventable, as well as which
departments had the highest level of injuries.
The Command Chronology is a living document maintained on a server which allowed
for frequent and easy review. Notes were taken based on what significant events occurred for
each department and the corresponding dates. As the Command Chronology is a confidential
document, no copies of it could be made. Thus, notes were the primary source of retaining
information.
Observations. Yin (2009) described direct observations as a more focused way of
collecting data than participant observation. Direct observation is where a researcher collects
data on site by watching the participant’s complete tasks in their normal environment. In this
case study, it was important to observe employees working on site with and without their
supervisor around to determine if leaders do inspire employees to work more safely.
Additionally, the direct observation allowed the researcher to determine whether employees
carry the safe behavior into work when they are unsupervised, if applicable.
To conduct the direct observations, the researcher engaged in five observations with
leadership on site and five observations without leadership on site which was very time
consuming as leadership rarely was onsite. Yin (2009) argued direct observation can be time
consuming which is one of the major drawbacks to it as a method of data collection. However,
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one of the benefits to direct observation was viewing the phenomenon through the lens of the
employees while in the natural environment (Yin, 2009). This greatly outweighed the negative
aspect of the time consumption. The researcher took notes as well as filled out an Observation
Chart (Appendix C) filled out with pertinent information.
The ten observations varied in length due to the nature of the mission being
accomplished, but the goal of each observation was thirty minutes. Participants were selected at
random from blue-collar employees currently working on jobsites in the field on the installation.
To be more specific, employees were randomly selected from the available workers who were
required to go into the field on any particular day. In order to obtain permission for the
observations, employees were verbally asked at the job site if they were amendable to being
observed for approximately thirty minutes or until the job mission was completed.
Due to the size of the installation population, it was not the intent of the researcher to
observe the same employee in the field more than one time. As the goal of the study was to
determine whether or not leadership impacts employee safety, observing the same employees
created the potential for an inaccurate representation of employees’ behavior on the jobsite. The
one caveat to observing the same employees multiple times would be to observe once with the
supervisor on site and once without the supervisor present. However, it was preferential to
observe the same five employees with and without leadership supervision on the jobsite.
The observation period was scheduled to be over a two-week period, but because
leadership rarely came onsite, it extended over a month and not all five of the anticipated
leadership observations were captured. Only one observation with a leader onsite occurred
instead of the five anticipated. Initially observation days were chosen based on how heavy the
workload was for the employees with days in which there were more jobs in the field being the
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preferable days to observe. However, it turned out that every day was a busy day, so days were
chosen based on researcher availability.
During observations, field notes were taken based on the Observation Chart components
as well as anything the researcher could hear the participants saying. After the observations, the
researcher transcribed the field notes onto the Observation Chart. Based on the transcribed field
notes, ten different participants were observed as well as one first-line supervisor in a total of six
observations.
Data Analysis
Thematic analysis was used to analyze data. Thematic analysis is simply “encoding
qualitative data” (Boyatzis, 1998). To best understand the data in this case study, a continuous
review and analysis of data was conducted to highlight what common themes and concepts
occurred. Boyatzis (1998) indicated there are a number of ways to structure and present thematic
research but lists and theme maps were the most useful in this case study. Coding is the process
of identifying themes or concepts within the data (Ezzy, 2002) and requires multiple steps to
achieve it. For this research, codes were assigned by what words or ideas were repeated in the
transcribed interviews. Key words looked for were words associated with the description of
leadership, how safety was defined and applied in the workplace, the descriptors of how the
military work environment impacted safety, and what perceptions employees had about working
with veterans.
Creating a theme map was suggested by Boyatzis (1998) to visually understand the
analyzed data. In order to create the theme map, interviews were first transcribed, and data was
highlighted if it was a key word as described above. Once the key words were highlighted,
multiple lists were created with each list specific to the word or tone, of the word used. For
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instance, if an interviewee said, “chain of command”, it was placed on the leadership list as it
described a type of leadership. If an interviewee said “PPE (personal protective equipment),” it
fell under the safety list.
The lists were maintained in Microsoft Excel which allowed for easy manipulation of the
lists. However, to visually comprehend the data, the list of unifying themes was transferred into
a mind map. The mind map was created using pencil and paper with the main themes being in
the largest bubbles. Subthemes were generated in smaller bubbles underneath the larger bubbles
and were connected with single lines. Drawing out the mind map allowed for easy manipulation
of themes as well as to see if any of the themes were interrelated.
Another visual map was created using index cards with common words or phrases, the
codes, written on them. Boyatzis (1998) suggested that creating a visual map is very helpful as
pieces are connected together to demonstrate the interconnectedness of the data. Using index
cards spread across the floor, each time another interview had one of the common words or
phrases repeated, another index card was created. By the end of reading the interview
transcriptions, the index cards were assembled to create a semi-bar graph on the floor. The
purpose was to demonstrate the amount of times each code was used in relation to other codes.
The results were transcribed onto the theme list with supportive quotes from different interviews
placed underneath. Having a visual representation allowed for the breadth of the material to be
put into perspective while also keeping evidence to support the themes allowed for easy review
afterwards. It also was beneficial to have two different means of visually representing the data
as it allowed for data to be double-checked.
Trustworthiness. The trustworthiness of qualitative research is the validity and
reliability of the data (Creswell, 2007). Merriam (1998) spoke to the importance of this
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information and said, “all research is concerned with producing valid and reliable knowledge in
an ethical manner” (pg. 198). As measures of how trustworthy data is, it is assessed on validity
and reliability with validity referring to the extent which study question answers are considered
to be accurate representations of the case (Hays, 2004).
Validity. Internal validity addresses how accurate research findings are with reality
(Merriam, 1998). Merriam suggested several methods in which to check validity with
triangulation being a very important procedure. Triangulation is the process by which three
points are used to verify meaning or to clarify different ways information may be perceived.
(Stake, 1995) and Yin (2009) argue that it is “the most desired pattern for dealing with case study
data” (p. 140). To build validity, a researcher must use multiple sources of data to verify the
results of the research. Merriam (1998) defined triangulation as using multiple sources,
methods, and investigators to confirm the findings of a case study. Creswell (2012) further
argued triangulation is integral to the case study and should be utilized to confirm any findings.
This study utilized observations, artifact collection, and interviews to collect data. Triangulation
was used to seek convergence in the data and to confirm or not confirm the emerging themes. In
addition, all participants were asked the same questions in the same order and member checking
was used to verify that participant responses were accurate once the researcher had transcribed
the interviews.
Allowing the participants to review their responses by having the researcher reiterate the
way she interpreted the responses was a second check of validity in the form of member checks.
Merriam (1998) stated member checking allows participants the opportunity to ensure their
thoughts and ideas were accurately conveyed to the researcher. In this case study, it was
important to understand the intent and meaning of the participants to fully understand the
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organizational climate. Periodically during the interviews, the researcher would review the data
and notes taken during the session and allow the participant to correct any misinterpretations.
Additionally, if any questions were had, the researcher would call or email the participant to
verify information.
Repeated observation is a third method suggested by Merriam (1998) as a way to increase
validity of qualitative research and described it as “gathering data over a period of time” (pg.
204). Reviewing historical data on accident and incident rates over the last four years provided a
clear snapshot as to whether there were any trends in safety mishaps and if so, if they changed
once command leadership placed an emphasis on them.
Subjectivity Statement
The purpose of a subjectivity statement is to provide the reader pertinent information
about the researcher to allow the reader to determine the trustworthiness of the researcher. As a
veteran working for the federal government on a military installation, I have many experiences
which have shaped my view of workplace safety and leadership involvement in work activities
including being hurt on the job while on active duty and as a civil servant as well as watching
others get hurt.
While on active duty, I was a supervisor in a top secret work center where I managed
communications for the military. I supervised ten military members and civilians on a daily
basis. I regularly trained my employees on safety aspects of the workplace as well as the proper
reporting procedures in the event of an accident or emergency. We only experienced a bomb
threat and an unauthorized intruder, but never a direct safety incident. I was hurt while running
where I broke my heel and several other bones in my foot. It was not directly work related, but
was related to maintaining my physical fitness which was a job requirement.
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Although no one I supervised was ever hurt, I have had several friends who were hurt in
the line of duty, particularly when deployed. While my accident was not preventable—it was
just a fluke—many of the accidents I saw my friends experience while deployed to combat zones
could have been prevented if they had taken the time to look at their surroundings, check their
vehicles before leaving the compound for convoys, and by using common sense. It is from these
experiences, I began to question whether safety was something inherently ignored by leadership
during times of war or if there was a cultural aspect to it.
After I left active duty, I served in several roles where I was the aide to senior leaders in
the federal government, both military and civilian. I was regularly charged with managing
training requirements, including safety, but never directly responsible for the reporting of safety
violations. It was not until approximately seven years ago when I was assigned as an assistant
safety manager where I would train up to 500 organizational co-workers on safety issues as well
as investigate safety mishaps. From this experience, I was appointed to run the Commanding
General’s employee safety committee which lead me to work directly with OSHA in how to
reduce safety mishaps on the installation. I served in this capacity for three and half years. I was
awarded the Safety Civilian of the Year award for my work on the safety committee.
Although I was as objective as possible, I went into the case study with the knowledge
that veterans may hesitate to talk negatively about their supervisors. Even when I worked for
poor leaders, I was always hesitant to say anything negative about them as the culture was to
look out for each other. With this in mind, I recognized it may take developing a rapport with
the participants or asking more pointed questions to get honest answers.
Chapter Summary
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This chapter has described the qualitative case study design of this study on leadership
and safety in a federal government military environment. The chapter also included a
description of the participants, the data collection plan and how data would be analysis were also
included. Indicators of trustworthiness and validity were discussed
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Chapter 4
Findings
This chapter contains the findings and data analysis from the case study. The purpose of
this case study was to determine how senior leaders impacted workplace safety in a military
environment and whether prior military experience impacts employee perception of how
workplace should be in a military environment. Existing literature did little to explain or
highlight the impact of senior leadership in a military work environment and did not cover what
being a military veteran did to impact employee perception of workplace safety. The first three
chapters of this case study offered an introduction to the issue of workplace safety on a military
environment, a review of current pertinent literature, and the methodological design for this case
study. This chapter will present the findings which emerged from the data collected.
A qualitative case study was utilized with data collected and analyzed from interviews,
observations, and artifact collection. Pseudonyms were used for all participants to keep their
identities and experiences private and all leadership is referred to in the male gender as the vast
majority of military members are males. All findings included in this chapter were in response
to the following research questions:
1. How do senior leaders impact workplace safety in a military work environment?
2. How does military experience impact employee perception of workplace safety in a
military work environment?
Themes
Many of the subthemes were applicable to both research questions, but the primary theme
which emerged in the first research question was the desire to recreate a military structure within
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the workplace. Subthemes of this were: 1. Viewing senior leaders as unicorns; 2. Code of
silence; 3. Self-sacrifice; 4. Military experience of supervisors; and 5. Irish pennants. All of
these themes essentially compared military life to civilian life which was not the intent of the
case study, but was brought forth by the participants in their responses. Research Question Two
had the primary theme of leading from the front with sub-themes of modeling behavior and
communication.
Research Question 1
Senior leaders play a tremendous role in workplace safety on a military installation as
their actions, or inactions sent a non-verbal message to employees about how the senior leaders
viewed workplace safety. More importantly though, midlevel civilian leadership played a bigger
impact on workplace safety in a military environment as they were the continuity within the
organization with the military members rotating out every three years. The civilian leadership
was also very important as they were often the spot where the participants believed
communication broke down in regard to providing the required safety resources and improving
morale within the organization.
Desire to recreate a military structure. Working in a high hazard, blue collar
environment, all the employees viewed senior leaders as crucial to workplace safety whether it
was through understanding the dynamics of the work, allowing employees to make decisions on
the spot, or providing the proper PPE to do the job safely. The participants in this case study all
worked in places where danger was ever present such as working on high voltage electricity,
dealing with hazardous material disposal, and maintaining electrical grids. From their
experiences in the military working in similarly high hazard areas, the participants created a
chain of command from their shop level supervisors all the way to the Commanding General of
79

the installation on whom to report any safety issues or how to request additional supplies or
resources to adequately complete the job.
During the interviews, all veterans balked at the idea of “jumping the chain of
command”, an idea which is ingrained in all military members, myself included, from the
moment they enter boot camp. The concept behind it is to never go one supervision level above
your current station, as there is a chain of command and proper way to do things. To jump the
chain of command would be the same as a custodian going straight to the president of an
organization and letting him or her know about issues on the lowest level.
Unfortunately, not jumping the chain of command also presents the issue which is
evident within this case study: poor leadership is not held accountable for poor decisions which
directly and indirectly impacted workplace safety based on the interviews. As there is no
interface with senior leadership and the blue-collar workers according to the interviews, senior
leaders do not know the state of affairs at the lower levels of their organization as they are only
hearing information from the problem middle-management. Without the senior leaders engaging
with the lower levels and finding out what is wrong, there is no way to rectify the issue of
middle-management.
The blue-collar workers in this case study all resisted the urge to go straight to senior
leaders and let them know there were major safety concerns. Comments like “I ain’t no chain of
command jumper” were made by all participants during the interviews and exhibited the innate
issue of how ingrained veterans were in recreating the military structure within their work
environment. Further, it also demonstrated the lack of confidence one level of bad leadership
created for the entire organization. By recreating the military structure and thus a chain-ofcommand within their work environment, the participants created their own barriers to safety.
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When they would not report safety issues created by the lack of involvement of middle
management whether it be from lack of funding or forcing the participants to make unsafe
choices, the participants were up against safety issues such as lack of PPE (both required and
quality), working in extreme conditions without required tools, being unable to make on the spot
decisions, and lack of morale within the organization created by their unwillingness to jump the
chain of command which they viewed as important as completing the mission, The chain of
command was a structure the participants could not break away from and it created their view of
senior leaders, at the top of the chain of command, as almost mythical creatures since they were
unable to ever interact with them.
Senior leaders viewed as unicorns. The participants in this case study, the ones at the
lowest levels of an organization, viewed senior leaders as if they were unicorns: they are seen so
rarely, the question was raised as to whether they actually existed. People hear about them and
what they have done, but no one has actually seen them, thus they are like a unicorn. Based on
personal experience, senior leaders often do not have the time to go and visit all levels of their
organization, but according to Blair (2013) it is vital for leaders to tour all spaces. He posited
leaders who visit with all stakeholders set the tone for what is acceptable behavior. However,
based on the interviews and observations, senior leaders, but more particularly middle
management never engaged in any type of visits with stakeholders. Based on my experience,
senior leaders rely on their middle managers to relay any issues or concerns to them, but when
they have poor management in place, they have no way of knowing about it. In the case study,
there were no observations of middle management visiting any worksites or shops nor did
participants report any leadership visits.
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If they cared about us, they would come see us. But they don’t. They stay in their
comfortable offices while we are out here struggling. (John, p. 56)
More importantly, the participants echoed how important they believe this was in their military
careers. Middle management not visiting any lower level employees created a serious issue with
employees’ perceptions of the leadership abilities of middle management.
While John, a veteran of the Iraq War, indicated the sentiment of all the other
participants, the lack of senior leaders, most particularly middle managers being visible while
participants engaged in high hazard work, also created an issue—or benefit—for their workplace
safety in that military leaders rotated out approximately every three years to new assignments,
thus a new set of leadership is in place. When questioned about how they felt about having
military and civilian leadership, the participants stated, “I was here before they came and I will
be here after they leave” or “I am just waiting them out” (implying the military leaders were
going to leave, thus the participants just had to wait until their rotation date). What is interesting
about this sentiment is how unique the structure of the military is: there is a firm end date on
when military members are at their units. The participants interviewed in this case study, all had
the same attitude about their military leadership—he was going to leave at some point so his
opinion and policies really did not matter as they would eventually change when his replacement
arrived.
The participants in this case study did not value their military leadership, particularly in
workplace safety as adding any value to the organization, but that is a misnomer because the
right leader does. It is due to the impact of the poor civilian leadership at the middle
management level which has diminished the faith in any and all leadership. This poor civilian
leadership has caused the participants to view military leaders as not adding value. Based on my
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experience in other similarly dynamic organizations, military leaders have the ability to motivate
civilians to positively change their own organization. Unfortunately, the participants in the case
study viewed military leaders as a uniform instead of as a leader with the ability to positively
impact their organization. One participant stated:
What does he know? I got kids older than him! Let him get some experience under his
belt and then we can talk about how important he is. Right now, all he is is a figure head
who is a “yes man” (someone who just says “yes” to everything even if it is the wrong
answer). (Wild “Will,” p. 17)
Military leaders were viewed as transient and only caring about how to make their bosses
happy, based on the interviews, but more importantly they were not viewed as making any
impact or having the ability to impact the organization because they would be leaving it within
three years. Thus, the participants had created a barrier to their own safety by refusing to even
entertain the ability of a military member to impact the organization in a positive manner.
Tying this to senior leadership and workplace safety, the participants created a chain of
command from their shop supervisors all the way to the Commanding General of the installation
in which the case study took place. Their chain of command and “jumping it” prevented workers
from reporting toxic leaders and unsafe conditions to someone who could act on it. Further, the
participants automatically devalued any guidance an active duty leader would add to their safety
environment. It is through their automatic devaluation of active duty, predominately officers,
which further created their self-imposed inability to report toxic leadership. One participant
articulated:
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What’s he gonna do for me? He is more worried about how his fitrep [performance
evaluation] looks than he is about how he can improve [the organization]. He hasn’t seen
combat so all this political bull s--t is relevant. When he gets shot at and watches his
brother get his head blown off, then making sure we all go home safe will be relevant to
him. (Jim, p. 41)
Based on Jim’s sentiments, it is clear the participants have created a barrier to their own safety as
they view their senior leaders, particularly military leaders, as untouchable and not pertinent to
their safety. The participants viewed senior leaders all the way down to middle management as
untouchable and out of touch with the lowest levels, thus creating a sense of discord amongst the
participants.
Code of silence. The discord amongst the participants was a misplaced sense of loyalty
seen every time the participants were queried about going above their leaders who were asking
them to commit unsafe actions; it was a code of silence which prevented them from jumping the
chain of command to tell on leaders who were not engaged in workplace safety whether actively
or peripherally. In reviewing the Lock-Out, Tag-Out (LOTO) program during artifact collection,
it was found the mission was unachievable—there was no program to review and had not been
for years. The code of silence from the employees when the LOTO program, a requirement for
national electrician programs, was non-existent yet none of the electricians queried about it were
willing to jump the chain of command and let someone know how serious of a safety violation
this was. The LOTO program, an OSHA requirement for any work site with energized
equipment, was nonexistent at this installation. The printed regulation manual did not have a
delegation letter from the senior officer in charge delegating authority to the program manager
nor did the manual have any information about what LOTO was which is a DOD and OSHA
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requirement. Based on research of the LOTO program and personal experience managing safety,
it was atypical of a professional organization to take LOTO seriously. All certified electricians
know about LOTO as it is such a fundamental part of electrical safety and licensures; yet the
organization in the case study had blank paper inside their manual. As both military and civilian
organizations follow LOTO, it was surprising to see nationally certified electricians not
following a standard procedure used in their field.
One visible and mandatory part of LOTO is the LOTO board; it has locks with one set of
keys and tags so anyone can lock out equipment when they are working on it. An individual
takes the lock and key set and then deenergizes a piece of equipment, placing the lock and tag
with his/her information on it. He or she keeps the keys so while he or she is working on it, it
cannot be reenergized, thus causing injury. However, when reviewing the board at the site, there
were locks with no keys and no tags. According to Monique, an Army veteran who is an HVAC
mechanic where the board was located:
Oh, we don’t use LOTO because our supervisor doesn’t think we need to. He says we
should be the only people on the roof so it don’t matter if we lock it out. We will know if
anyone else is up there. ‘Sides, girl who is gonna wanna come up here when it is hot as
b---s? You be trippin’! (Monique, p. 16)
Per OSHA regulations and best practices, the supervisor of a shop utilizing LOTO should
be the manager of the program. The lack of participation by the supervisor or any level of
leadership demonstrated either a distinct uncaring approach to workplace safety or a lack of
knowledge on what was occurring within the lower levels of the organization. However, the
Code of Silence the participants had informally sworn to, prevented them from sharing not only
toxic leadership, but also from fixing safety hazards.
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I ain’t getting on anyone’s bad side. They know they are wrong, but I am not putting a
target on my back by letting anyone know (the LOTO program was defunct). Karma is a
b***h. (Monique, p. 16)
By the participants’ unwillingness to “tell” on toxic leadership, they perpetuated the cycle of
unsafe situations as senior leaders—those who can make toxic leaders do something—were
never aware of what was happening. Thus, unmitigated safety risk were created by the
participants not only for them, but for the organization.
Furthermore, the idea of being a “chain of command jumper” meant they would not tell
on leaders even when it meant they were endangering themselves. The mentality that came
through, based on the interviews, was they take care of their own even when it is to their own
detriment and self-sacrifice.
When a leader don’t take care of his troops, you take care of them. When you are boots
on the ground [combat] you look to the guy to the left and the right of you and know they
got your back. It doesn’t matter what color they are, it matters that you can count on
them. Your CO [commanding officer] isn’t down there watching over you—he is in the
COB [contingency operating base] making decisions without bullets flying over his head.
(Chuck, p. 2)
Chuck’s statement highlights the sense of brotherhood the military embodies—you must
take care of your brothers and sisters regardless of the setting. During the interviews, the
participants said over and over again how their military background created a bond which no one
can understand unless they had served. The sense of brotherhood was two-fold: one, you must
take care of the guys to your back, but two, “you are winning the fight” (achieving the mission)
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for your senior leaders whether “they are taking rounds” (getting shot at or actively engaging in
the fight) or not, according to the participants. This is what highlights the misplaced sense of
loyalty: even when leaders are giving bad orders, the guys on the ground are making decisions to
ensure the mission is successful.
Self-sacrifice. The misplaced sense of loyalty and code of silence created an
environment where participants were taking unnecessary risks with their personal safety in order
to avoid telling on toxic leadership. During a field observation, an air conditioner (HVAC)
mechanic Omar was seen on a roof which was about fifteen feet in the air. Standard OSHA
procedure for fall protection is to tie onto something when climbing over six feet off the ground
as well as have someone on the ground as a safety guide. It is not only a requirement of OSHA
for to have fall protect safety training each year, but it is an organizational requirement to have
the training annually as well. While conducting a review of historical accident records, an
accident was identified in which Omar was involved in. Omar, the participant, confirmed that he
was the subject of the accident record and described further what happened to him. According to
the objective accident records and Omar’s description, he did not have anyone on the ground as
there was a continuous shortage of personnel, when he climbed onto the building about fifteen
feet up. The building did not have anything for him to tie onto as well which is a federal
building code requirement. On his way back down, Omar fell and broke his arm. During a
subsequent field observation, Omar was viewed on the roof again with no fall project gear on.
When questioned, he said if he didn’t fix the HVAC then senior leadership would have a “s--t
fit”.
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When further questioned about why the building did not meet federal building code
requirements, Omar explained the building was slated for demolition in about ten years so the
government was not willing to expend any money on upgrading the building:
They don’t GIVE A F--K! They are not going to spend money to fix this building when
they are going to tear it down in a few years. It is a waste of money for them and we all
know money talks—they don’t care if I break myself a hundred more times as long as
they don’t have to do s--t to this building before they demo it (Omar, p. 10).
Even though Omar, a former Marine, had nothing positive to say about his leadership
who according to him were essentially forcing him to put his life in jeopardy, his actions clearly
indicated he valued achieving the mission over his own safety. I am not sure if I would call it
hatred, but the extreme dislike Omar had for his leaders and how he felt obligated to continually
put himself in danger really demonstrated a common theme of the participants which was being
unwilling—and/or unable to—put their personal safety and health ahead of the mission.
The theme of self-sacrifice was also demonstrated through field observations when more
experienced workers mentored the more junior. Wild Will was the first to take the highest risk
tasks while allowing Timmy, a retired Marine, to watch and learn from him. Although they were
not too far off in age from each other, the relationship between the two was one of unofficial
mentor/mentee. Wild Will would always take the higher risk tasks in a way to prevent Timmy
from having to endanger himself, further demonstrating the idea of self-sacrifice. For instance,
in one observation, Wild Will was clearly bordering on exhaustion from the harsh conditions and
long hours he had been working to get a transformer back up which would restore electricity to
Officer Housing (a main priority). Instead of allowing Timmy to take over, Wild Will continued
to work as the original transformer had been installed “bass akwards,” or in other words it had
88

been installed so improperly it was creating a major safety hazard just to work on it. Wild Will’s
reasoning for not allowing Timmy to work on the transformer was because Wild Will was “older
so I can kick the bucket first. Timmy has more years left to give so he is more valuable.”
As Monique, an Army veteran described her experiences working within the
organization, she explained that “Jack” had taken her under his wing. As the only female in the
HVAC shop, she was responsible for working on and maintaining HVACs all over the
installation. Working on the installation was a new experience for her as “everything was broke
with no hope of fixing it,” meaning all the equipment was different and improperly installed
which caused the mechanics to constantly work to fix a problem rather than prevent it. Jack took
it upon himself to teach her the tricks of each piece of equipment while also explaining the
nuances of each building to help her better understand who had priority when things broke.
Jack was a former Navy Sailor and his desire to help train Monique was just a further
example of the self-sacrifice role the military veterans took upon themselves. While Wild Will
would take the high hazard tasks, Jack took a different approach and sought to prevent Monique
from running into political issues (not working on buildings in the unofficial priority order) while
also not hurting herself from the nuances each piece of equipment had. Based on the
observations of Jack and Monique, Jack recognized the need to be politically savvy on the
installation. When there is any senior leadership involved, whether within the organization or
other organizations on the installation, it was crucial to know how politics played into
prioritization of projects. If the Commanding General is involved—his work is the first priority
over anything else while other ranks have prioritization after the Commanding General based on
how senior they are and what their mission was. Without understanding the politics and how
rank impacts workload, complaints will be made by the customers who then cause all levels of
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leadership, particularly middle management to become angry and demand answers. By
recognizing the politics which often drive getting work accomplished, the participants were
isolating their chain of command from having to deal with any customer complaints. During the
observation, I witnessed Jack explaining the personalities of different people of senior ranks and
billets—and then explain how those people would react if they felt slighted by being placed in a
queue for equipment to be fixed. He even explained how their spouses would react if they were
out of electricity or air conditioning for too long. It demonstrated to me how senior leaders
impacted the workplace and safety, as rank created priorities to fix equipment even when the
actual mission (training military members and deploying to foreign states) was failing. From
personal experience, Jack taking Monique under his wing to explain the politics involved in the
military was very important. In a previous role, I dealt with several general officers, their
spouses, and senior civilians who believed the rules should be bent for them—but no one else.
In one case, I slighted a senior leader by sending him an email which said “will” instead of
“shall”; he viewed it as lowly me directing him to do something instead of asking him nicely. I
was reprimanded by my supervisors in some pretty harsh words, but I realized from there the
need to understand senior military leader protocol, and senior leaders who were veterans at this
site, expected to be treated special.
This idea of prioritizing equipment repairs/fixtures for senior leaders created the idea of
sacrificing personal safety to finish the mission even if it meant putting life and limb at risk.
While Omar was still willing to climb onto buildings without protection, it was the electricians
who would willingly work on equipment knowing it was unsafe and against regulations. In one
observation, a large tactical vehicle ran into a telephone pole with overhead electrical wires. The
pole was precariously being held up by the vehicle and if the vehicle was moved, the pole would
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fall and throw energized power lines all over a parking lot. Instead of de-energizing the power
lines and clearing the parking lot to allow the pole to fall, the electricians got into the bucket of a
bucket truck and were elevated to the top of the power lines. Although it was unclear what they
were doing, the comments overheard were how the senior official on base wanted the pole
replaced immediately with no interruption to the mission:
The colonel said we needed to get this s--t up ASAP [as soon as possible]. If we don’t
get this s--t done then we won’t hear the end of it. Mother f-----s just don’t understand
how f-----g dangerous this s--t is. F-----g d--k bags should get their pansy a---s out here
and see how important the mission is when the s--t is about my fry my insides (Wild
Will, p. 18).
Senior leaders directly perpetuate the idea of self-sacrifice by either rewarding or failing
to acknowledge unsafe behavior from the participants. By failing to acknowledge unsafe
behavior as a systemic problem, senior leaders perpetuate the idea of self-sacrifice by rewarding
it. Omar was never held accountable for continuing to make unsafe decisions even though his
accident likely cost the organization tens of thousands of dollars on medical bills and
compensation, senior leaders did not take the time to dig further into the situation; as Omar was
not an isolated case, the historical records indicate there were several major incidences, yet none
of them triggered senior leader to question what was causing all the safety issues, thus
inadvertently rewarding bad safety behavior.
Military experience for supervisors. Veterans of the military who served as direct
supervisors were more respected by the participants in this case study based on observations and
interviews. All the first-line supervisors at the organization, were veterans of the military with
most having served in combat and with over 20 years of service. The participants all responded
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to whether they liked their supervisor and believed their supervisor cared about their safety with
responses such as: “My supervisor is straight” or “My supervisor is out there in the trenches with
us,” both demonstrating the belief that first-line supervisors were willing to get dirty and lead
from the front—or not ask their employees to do anything they, the supervisor, was unwilling to
do themselves.
During an observation, one supervisor who was also a veteran, was sharing chewing
tobacco (dip) with one of his employees while watching other employees work on high voltage
power lines. Although there was no specific need to be on the job site, the supervisor was there
in the sweltering heat. Of his employees interviewed, all responded about how the supervisor
was not of any particular help, but it made them feel better that he was willing to suffer along
with them. According to one veteran of the Persian Gulf War who was on the jobsite:
He’s a good dude. He don’t have to be out here, but he is. It makes me feel like he gives
a s--t because he is suffering out here with us. (Timmy, p. 20)
According to another Persian Gulf War veteran, he had no respect for middle management and
senior leadership as he felt they did not care about his well-being as long as the mission was
completed:
I haven’t had a weekend off in over 17 weeks, but do they care? No, they sit in their
cushy offices and don’t give a flip that I am burnt out, ready to explode as long as the
work gets done. I’d like to see them work 17 weeks without a break and not get
hazardous pay and then see how they like it! [He is referencing the pay deployed service
members get when they are deployed to combat zones] (Wild Will, p. 19).
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The disparity between the way middle management and senior leaders were viewed
compared to the way direct supervisors with military experience were viewed was clearly more
favorable for those with military experience. When queried about the difference between senior
leaders such as the Commanding General and the middle managers such as the Commanding
Officer and Deputy Commanding Officer, the participants indicated the Commanding General
was too busy to deal with what was happening at the lower levels and that middle management
should handle it except when the middle management (Deputy Commanding Officer) had no
military experience and didn’t understand their responsibilities.
The participants all indicated they appreciated and respected the leader who was out
there “turning wrenches” with them in the extremes rather than the leader who sat in an office
and was oblivious to who was working for him, particularly like the Deputy Commanding
Officer. Wild Will’s statement demonstrated how he felt slighted based on his long work hours
in extreme conditions while his supervisors enjoyed the fruits of his labor in air-conditioned
spaces. What is key about this is the leaders who were the source of most of the ire for the
participants had no military experience and were white collar workers with undergraduate
degrees. According to a participant, Kris:
That piece of s--t doesn’t have any combat experience. I was with all three Marine
Division [a badge of honor amongst Navy Corpsman and Marines] while he was chewing
his pencils in college. My college was sticking my finger in bullet holes to save lives.
F--k him. Even with my BSN [Bachelors of Science in Nursing] I learned more boots on
the ground [learning through experience] than I ever did in college. Hell, I knew more
about drug interactions than some of my professors did and had to school them in class. I

93

know I pissed in the Wheaties of some of the professors because I had to…correct their
mistakes when they forgot the interactions with some pharmaceuticals. (Kris, p. 8)
The idea of leaders having military experience went beyond understanding the work
task, but more importantly understanding the military culture and how the culture impacted the
specific work tasks. When participants described their ideal leader during interviews, they
described someone who understood the nuances of military culture, particularly the idea of being
one piece in a whole puzzle. When a person is one piece in a whole puzzle, they were more
willing, according to the participants, to sacrifice himself to the greater good of the mission. By
having leaders who had no military experience, safety was impacted as they were automatically
discredited by the participants. Even if the leader was correct, they were discredited, and the
participants continued to engage in unsafe behavior. From my experience in the military, we call
this “street cred” and if someone had not worked on the streets to earn the respect of others, they
were considered a “joker” or a “clown”, a person who does not know what they are talking
about. In the case study, the participants viewed leaders without military experience much the
same way as I viewed people without street cred.
Research Question Two
Prior military experience absolutely impacted the way employees engaged in workplace
safety. Employees who were veterans all subscribed to the idea of leading from the front which
clearly defined what they wanted to see from their leaders. The lack of getting the type of
leadership they desired then caused them to become lackadaisical in their own safety.
Employees began to perceive their personal safety as a direct reflect of how much leadership
cared for them. When participants compared their currently leadership to leadership they
appreciate from prior experiences, the leaders who were actively involved by leading from the
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front set a positive tone of safety being paramount to the success of the mission. The current
middle management leadership set a tone of safety not being important and the personal safety of
the employees being unimportant as the leadership continually asked the employees to engage in
unsafe behaviors while in the course of duty.
Leading from the front. Leading from the front is one of the most embraced styles of
leadership in the military (Creech, n.d.). When a leader is leading from the front, it means he is
doing exactly what he is asking his troops to do. It is through doing menial tasks and taking the
same risks asked of troops by which a leader successfully leads from the front. As a former
Sailor, when leaders asked me to do something dangerous while they enjoyed the confines of
safety, it always created a bitter pill as it seemed like leaders did not care about me or my safety.
In this case study, leading from the front was important to all employees interviewed, with all
except one being veterans. With that style of leadership being the most successful in the
military, it was surprising it was not exemplified by leaders at all levels as the site was a military
installation. What was not surprising was the way the employees began to take unnecessary risks
with their safety when they felt like there were no repercussions for their actions.
In the military, the expectation of being wild and crazy goes hand-in-hand with being a
service member—the two are almost indistinguishable, from personal experience. Troops are
expected to get the job done at all costs, regardless of their own personal safety and then
celebrate at the end. Jose explained his first experience with the military as a door repairman on
the installation:
Man, they would just kick the doors in. The door would work fine on Friday morning,
but by Monday morning I would have a work ticket in to fix it again. I would check it
out and there would be boot prints all over. I got tired of that trash so one I day I asked
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one of the guys in the barracks why all the doors were always breaking. He said they just
kicked them in. What? Are you kidding me? They just got bored over the weekends so
they would just kick the doors to see how many times it took before they broke the door.
(Jose, p. 29)
What Jose experienced with the service members kicking the doors in, is more normal
than abnormal. When I was on active duty, I made several poor choices which seemed normal at
the time as did my husband who is active duty. One of the best examples from our younger days
of being young and dumb would be when my husband was in Iraq and was required to move a
mobile building. The building was being loaded on a tactical vehicle trailer by a crane. The
crane slings would lift the active duty members to the roof of the building and then the service
members would hand the slings down to people on the ground to be attached to the building.
The crane would then lift the building with the personnel on it, onto the trailer. The issue was
the service members had no protective gear on in case they fell the approximately 50 feet in the
air and the people operating the crane were Iraqi nationals who did not have actual OSHA
licenses (or licenses at all) to operate the equipment. Further, the leadership just chuckled at
seeing the service members do this since it was viewed as being inventive to accomplish the
mission.
When making those unsafe decisions, the leadership turned a blind eye and almost
rewarded us for completing the mission under intense circumstances like the crane instance. It
was when they did not reward us that we began to become disgruntled about the lack of
involvement by leadership which was echoed by Wild Will:
These fat f--ks talk about how important safety is, but when are they out in the 120degree heat? I am wearin’ a marshmallow man suit so I don’t get fried alive making sure
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all these officers have their air conditioning, yet there is no one out here checking to see
if me or Timmy are alive. All they care about is looking good to their bosses—they don’t
give a rat f--k about us jokers who are actually doing the work. (p. 19)
When working with high voltage electricity, employees must wear large suits to help minimize
the impact of being electrocuted; they look like bomb diffusion suits. The suits add to the
already extreme heat, thus creating a safety hazard in hot weather themselves. According to
Wild Will, senior leaders never put themselves in an uncomfortable situation (which was
confirmed during field observations as senior leaders rarely ever came to a job site), such as
going to a job site in the extreme temperatures, which caused him to doubt their ability as
leaders. To Wild Will, leaders should have been suffering along with the employees if not to
actually provide useful help, but demonstrate they were willing to do the same tasks (like
suffering) in the same conditions. Essentially, leaders would model the behavior they wanted.
The most desired style of leadership by the participants was also the most popular style in
the military: leading from the front. Veteran experiences directly impacted workplace safety by
setting ingrained standards and behaviors the participants expected to engage in as well as what
they expected out of their leaders. When the leaders in this case study did not embrace the
concept of leading from the front, the participants discounted the leaders’ abilities to do
anything. The participants believed the leaders did not understand the stressors, frustrations, and
unique nature of the work they were doing, thus anything leaders said was ignored, particularly
when the leaders had any guidance on safety.
Modeling behavior. Leading from the front would model the correct behavior—safe
behavior in the case study according to Creech (n.d.). Being a civil servant who is a veteran and
still working in a military environment reinforced the need of the employee to be tough and push
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through to make sure the mission was accomplished. Leaders who empowered employees to
stop work if their safety was at risk, but more importantly would have supported employees for
putting safety first is what the employees of the organization were seeking which was confirmed
during interviews. As all but one participant were veterans, most having been in combat, they
viewed completing their mission for the whole as more important than for each of them as an
individual. Sacrificing for your brother or sister is the ingrained motto for veterans.
It was initially surprising leaders did not recognize the value of having veterans and their
drive of completing the mission at all costs. However, it became evident quickly as to why when
the leader in charge of all civilian personnel had no military background. He was a professional
with a four-year degree who had “lucked into his job” (according to multiple participants)
instead of through merit or leadership ability. Prior to taking the deputy position, he had
unsuccessfully led a small contingent of civilians, all of whom had undergraduate degrees at a
minimum, based on the interviews.
Ole’ boy couldn’t even get his admin b*****s to do what they was supposed to—look at
how many projects they are behind schedule in. But they still get promoted and get
positions created for them since they go to church with the big boss. It makes me sick.
(Wild Will, p. 19.)
Chuck also articulated his lack of confidence in the Deputy Commanding Officer as the
quality of projects leaving the office he previously supervised was subpar and created more work
in the field when Chuck would attempt to supervise them. He further articulated how he
perceived the Deputy to have favorites after several billets were created and people were
promoted, all of whom were members of the Deputy’s church, leaving Chuck questioning
whether the Deputy was a fair and just man. Based on Chuck’s statement, it was clear the
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Deputy’s ability to lead was questioned based on how his “friends” were hired. Having come
from a white-collar background, Chuck further argued the Deputy did not understand or have the
patience to understand the nuances of blue-collar workers.
The employees interviewed all referred back to their experiences while on active duty;
they kept discussing how leaders who got dirty with them were the type of leaders they wanted.
They further discussed how leaders who empowered their subordinates through letting them
make the decisions as the technical experts would get more of their respect than their current
leadership would. Chuck summed up the role of a leader in a military environment and it was
similar to what the other participants interviewed desired:
A senior leader is someone who lets the experts do their job and is willing to take the flak
if something goes wrong. When I was a Master Guns [Master Gunnery Sergeant, the
most senior enlisted billet in the Marine Corps], it was not my job to tell the Marines how
to do their job, but to inspire them to want to do it right. If I told them how to do their
job, I would spend all my time on that. If I inspired them to do their job, I was allowing
them to become technical experts in their field, but also empowering them to make
decisions on the battlefield where I wasn’t going to be there to guide them. (Chuck, p 1)
The crux of what Chuck said was to empower employees to make decisions because there
are going to be emergency situations where you cannot wait for an answer from leadership. A
great example Chuck gave was the need to make split second decisions when you were fighting
in hand-to-hand combat. If the military members are not empowered to make decisions such as
which direction to turn, whether to shoot if shot at, or whether to negotiate or walk away, people
can die—literally. Based on Chuck’s example, the parallel could be drawn between engaging in
combat and working in high hazard areas that all of the participants did. If the people actually
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turning wrenches or flipping switches with their lives on the line do not feel comfortable making
a decision which could kill them, it indicates they are not empowered within their organization.
Based on the interviews, the employees openly complained about how long it took to get answers
when they were working in the field, thus delaying their work and extending the time they are in
hazardous areas. While some directly said they were not empowered, others alluded to it during
the interviews about how they are often stuck in the hazardous situations while they wait for
senior leadership to tell them what to do, instead of allowing them to do their jobs as subjectmatter experts. When employees are not empowered to make decisions, particularly when it
regards their personal safety, they tend to be more afraid of the repercussions associated with
making a wrong decision, according to Creech (n.d.).
For instance, we see Omar afraid to tell his leadership “no” when it comes to going on the
roof under unsafe conditions; he knows it is wrong per regulations, but the overriding fear of
retribution from supervisors causes him to throw caution to the wind. Had Omar been
empowered to make a call about what conditions he could work under, he would have likely
been more willing to take initiative in other areas according to Creech (n.d.).
Hell no, I ain’t making no decisions. I ask the questions and wait for the answers ‘cause I
don’t want to get in trouble for making the wrong call. (Omar, p. 12)
Omar’s reasoning for not making calls even when he has the experience and expertise to
do so further illustrated the overarching idea of leaders modeling the behavior they want. A
leader leading from the front is a leader who is empowering his employees to make decisions
based on the way they have been trained. When an employee feels empowered to make common
sense decisions, they feel valuable to the organization as they have some power to make a
difference (Ugwu, et. al., 2014). In the case study, it was clear empowering employees to make
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changes was not standard operating procedure not only based on statements based on Omar, but
on the field observations.
During one observation of LaMonte, it was clear he was unwilling to make a decision on
something he clearly knew the answer to. An oil-water separator broke which caused washracks to go down, preventing military units needing to wash their vehicles to be unable to. When
military comes back from any mission, their vehicles have to be washed in wash-racks which are
essentially industrial sized car washes. When vehicles are unable to be washed, they cannot be
turned back in. This means the service members are essentially at a stalemate, preventing them
from going home. In LaMonte’s case, the oil-separator prevents the oil, grease, fuel, and other
toxic elements from going into the ground water. Without the oil-water separator, the wash-rack
was closed. Knowing that a part would need to be ordered, but also that there was a short-term
fix to the problem, LaMonte deferred fixing the oil-water separator until the middle management
could bless it. It took two days for middle management to address the issue, thus overusing the
other wash racks and making the service members work extended hours on both days instead of
being with their families after having been gone for over a month.
The case of LaMonte is a perfect example of how the organization in the case study did
not empower employees, meaning they did not model the behavior they wanted. Based on the
body language during the interview and the statements made at the oil-water-separator, LaMonte
did not feel comfortable making a decision to temporarily fix the machine as he feared negative
backlash from middle management. Perhaps if LaMonte felt confident he would not face
reprimand for temporarily fixing the equipment, he could have saved hundreds of military
manhours. Instead, leaders had not modeled effective behavior, but instead rewarded the lack of
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proactive behavior from employees by negatively reinforcing positive behavior (the a-s
chewings), thus creating an inefficient system.
Modeling behavior in this case study had a direct impact on how the participants viewed
workplace safety based on the interviews and observations. The participants repeatedly
discussed how they were not “empowered to make split second decisions” and thus they were
unwilling to make any decisions even when they had enough latitude to make them. The
participants again attempted to replicate their military experiences by modeling behavior of their
leaders. As they sought to model the behavior of their leaders, they found not making a decision
was the desired behavior, thus they deferred every decision even when they clearly knew the
answer. LaMonte’s behavior highlights this behavior: middle management would take days to
make a decision so LaMonte deferred making a decision for days, thus modeling the behavior of
leaders. The idea of deferring a decision comes from the negative reinforcement of making a
decision—the undesirable a—s chewing. The experience of being a veteran directly impacted
workplace safety by reverting to military service experiences of modeling the desired behavior;
when leaders were complacent or slow to make a decision, the participants in this study modelled
the behavior. However, the complacency and slow decision making created a barrier to safety as
some safety decisions must be made immediately—like whether to break fall protection rules
like Omar repeatedly did.
Communication. Communication and respect were intertwined and equally as important
to the participants according to their interviews, yet according to them, they often did not find it
in anyone above their first or second level chain of command. Employees consistently discussed
how they were blindsided by work and not told the importance of it until they were late or taking
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too long to achieve it. Simply communicating upfront what was going on would have grabbed
employee buy-in immediately as well as caused them to act as needed based on the interviews.
It was not just when employees did not know the importance of a task or job,
communication was lacking in understanding processes which dictated all aspects of working for
the government. One process which was a constant source of frustration was the acquisition
cycle. When anything is purchased there are Congressional regulations governing it; from what
type of ink pens can be purchased to the amount they cost—the regulations are so in-depth they
cover thousands of pages of procurement regulations called the Federal Acquisition Regulation
and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation. The employees who are working in the field
often do not have any idea of the process or the requirements; most employees do not unless they
work directly with the acquisition cycle.
Employees vented on how frustrated they were when they would request to buy a specific
part by a specific manufacturer.
Why do they have to get a different part each friggin’ time I order it? Just buy like ten of
the damn things since you know the damn things gonna break! S--t! It’s not rocket
science! (Kris, p. 8)
As stated by “Wild” Will, his frustration with the acquisition process was evident in all of
the participants interviewed. In a technical environment, the reasons for why an item had to be a
specific make and model often came down to years of experience knowing generic brands would
not work well with the piece of equipment or because the life cycle of generics would not be as
long as name-brand. However, when they would get the part it would be the generic brand they
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specifically asked not to have. The employees who actually bought it would try and explain they
had no choice but to buy the part; their hands were tied by regulations.
The employees were the ones who had to deal with the delay in getting the required parts
and/or explain to the customer why the equipment broke again. If the employee understood the
process and requirements, they could better explain it to the external customers they meet while
doing business. However, the lack of information leads to frustration and anger towards leaders
as described by Kris, a Navy veteran with several combat deployments.
You have customers blowing you up because they are dying inside. They pull rank on
you and call J---s C----t to get their HVAC fixed, but there ain’t s--t I can do. I am at the
mercy of the people ordering the parts I need and good luck guessing when those b------s
are actually going to get in. Add to it there are times we get s----y parts just because they
are cheaper. I ask the supply guys all the time why I have to get the s----y cheap parts
when it is actually cheaper in the long run to just get the good ones the first time. See,
the leaders don’t give two s---s about us because they be puttin’ us in these h--la
dangerous situations and then making us deal with irate customers who don’t understand
the position we are in. Then they buy us the cheap parts and just keep saying it is
because of funding and regulation. B---h, please. It is just because you are cheap and
trying to save a dolla’ to make yourself look good. (Kris, p. 8)
Where it could have been improved was if the senior leaders listened to the concerns of
the employees and then explained the acquisition process, even if it was in the most basic terms.
It often seemed as if employees were just expected to accept the standard answer of “because
regulations made me” as the reason why they received the stuff they did not want based on the
interviews. Instead, if senior leaders explained the process and discussed ways to think outside
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of the box, employees could have directed their efforts to finding a solution they would have
been happy with while also adhering to the regulations governing the acquisition process.
What was also interesting about Kris’s statement was the anger in which he explained his
frustration at the acquisition process. It seemed as if he was completely removed from the
process and really had no understanding of how Congressional regulations govern buying parts.
From personal experience, it is hard to understand the acquisition process as it is very convoluted
for a seasoned professional, let alone someone with no experience. Based on Figure (3), a flow
chart was created to demonstrate the process for simplified acquisitions within the DOD. The
font is always small and so hard to read, it is almost fruitless to try and understand it.
Add to the confusion about reading the acquisition life cycle, Congress governs the
process of how things are purchased so things change regularly. Set forth in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the process for all government agencies seeking to purchase
anything from a chair to a tank. Further, the Defense FAR (DFAR) tailors things for DOD,
while each agency and sub agency of DOD tailors the purchasing requirements. For instance,
working for the Department of the Army and then moving to the Department of Air Force could
mean the way things are purchased are different depending on the way each agency has
interpreted the DFAR. Further, each individual installation (base) will further tailor the guidance
from the FAR, DFAR, and down, thus meaning if you go from Ft. Irwin (Army installation) to
Ft. Rucker (Army installation) the process to purchase services or supplies could be markedly
different just based on the more stringent guidelines each level of leadership has set forth. The
lack of clear guidance and universal interpretation further puts Kris’s statement into context as
regulations could change regularly. Further, the convoluted nature of government acquisitions
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makes it hard for someone with no background to understand and accurately explain to another
person why parts or requirements are not working as they should.

Figure 3. Defense Acquisition Flow Chart
Another area which clearly demonstrated issues with communication was the way the
organization was structured in regard to the flow of information. The military has a very
structured approach to the way communication is governed: from the top down with people not
going above their level, or jumping the chain of command which is detailed not only in the
interviews, but also from personal experience and the way Creech (n.d.) explains the barriers to
safety communication. However, there are senior leaders who encourage troops to jump levels if
they are not getting the answers they need. Although in theory this is a good idea, it is rarely
ever used as the person who jumped levels is seen as undisciplined and a general bad individual.
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From the interviews with veterans, it was clear their mentality still held true to this as they did
not report safety hazards or unbecoming practices which impacted their morale.
When questioned about the biggest issue within the organization which directly impacted
their safety, the employees replied it was leadership not sharing information with them. The
structure of how the military transmits information is from the top down with each subordinate
level of leadership adding or spinning the message with their interpretation. The lack of
communication from the top echelons of the organization indicated there was a disconnect
somewhere around the second or third echelon. Employees discussed how their direct supervisor
and his supervisor shared information with them, but there was no overarching guidance coming
from the commanding officer which is atypical of a military organization. The commanding
officer always puts out his guidance and all subordinate leaders tailor their guidance to this in
order to accomplish the mission. Basically put, what interests the commanding officer will
fascinate all lower levels of leadership.
LaMonte, a Persian Gulf War veteran summed up this sentiment:
Man, you know these chuckleheads care about something when they are out here in the
trenches with you. When they are wearing all the PPE, sweating b---s alongside of you,
you know they give two s---s. If the General is out here or the Colonel, then you know
everyone else down the line is gonna give two s---s and make it his top priority to be out
here (LaMonte, p. 59).
The disconnect was clearly coming from the civilian leader the employees referred to as a
“chucklehead.” This became clear when employees discussed how they trusted their first and
second level leaders whom they felt were authentic in the information they shared. It was the
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lack of guidance from the commanding officer to the direct supervisors which caused the
employees to pinpoint the same person whom they distrusted because of his lack of involvement
in their direct work, but demanded more and more from them in harsh conditions. This was
where information seemed to stop, thus creating an even deeper level of distrust amongst the
employees.
What also became clear after the interviews was not where the disconnect was, but how
important it was for the veterans to not jump levels of communication. Even if they knew how
to solve a problem and that senior leaders would want to hear the information, the employees
would not share it for fear of jumping their chain of command. When queried as to why they
were hesitant to overstep their disconnected leader, every single veteran reverted back to the
mentality of not wanting to “throw” their leader “under the bus.” In military speak, they felt a
need to remain silent in order to protect their own, even if the one they were protecting was in
the wrong.
The code of silence amongst the veterans directly related to their unhappiness on the job.
They described feeling unvalued which made them more reckless with their actions; their value
was directly tied to the success or failure of the mission, with quality of work and ingenuity
secondary. It was not surprising to see this type of mentality as the military does promote the
one team, one fight mentality. Chuck expanded:
One team, one fight—it don’t matter who served where, but together we are team
whether we like it or not. We are the one percent [of people in the American population
who are eligible to and do serve in the military] and we gotta take care of our own.
(Chuck, p. 1)
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When anyone is frustrated with their job, they tend to make mistakes and just not care as they tie
their value not to the success of the mission, but rather have no ownership of the mission. When
employees feel like they are stakeholders in the success of a mission, they strive to do their best
while also achieving the mission.
Overall, is was very evident veterans will take unnecessary risks with their personal
safety. They have a code of silence based on their experiences with military ethics and
communication structure which causes them to accept the risks and the lack of information if
they are still achieving their overall mission. With better communication and demonstration of
appreciation, veterans have the ability to improve their organization. When the participants
became complacent because the required changes were not flowing through communication
channels, the morale of the organization decreased and the participants started to take
unnecessary risks. It was from their military experience, based on observations, which drove
their desire for communication to occur on a regular basis and the lack of regular communication
with middle and senior leadership which caused them to be complacent in their personal safety.
Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I discussed the two major themes that emerged from the data: recreating a
military structure and leading from the front and they were made up of the following sub-themes:
senior leaders as unicorns; code of silence; self-sacrifice; communication; military experience for
supervisors; self-sacrifice; modeling behavior; and communication. The idea of recreating a
military structure was the desire of the participants to create a military structure like the one they
were accustomed to in the military where there was a clear chain of command and to jump it was
taboo. The research also indicated that the participants were unwilling to tell on leadership who
were placing them in unsafe situations, instead choosing to place themselves in harm’s way in
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order to complete the mission. The research also indicated leaders who had military experience
were more successful in gaining buy-in from employees in a military work environment,
particularly if they lead from the front by demonstrating the desired behavior and clearly
communicating what is going on in the organization to the employees. Chapter Five includes the
discussion, implications, and areas for future research.
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Chapter 5
Findings
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to describe how senior leadership impacted
workplace safety in a military environment as well as how being a veteran impacted the
perception of workplace safety. This chapter includes a discussion of major findings and their
implications in relation to the literature on military environments, military cultures, and
workplace safety. The chapter then concludes with a discussion of limitations of the case study
and areas for future research.
Discussion and Implications
My study demonstrates that for my participants there is a connection between being a
veteran and how they view their workplace safety, particularly in a military environment where
they can recreate the military structure. A better understanding of how veterans view their
workplace safety compared to how civilians, or people with no military experience, has the
potential to reduce accident rates and preserve lives in military environments.
Adult Learning
While Knowles (2012) has generated tremendous work on how adults learn, the primary
tenet which is reinforced by this study is the idea of adults needing motivation to learn. Knowles
argued there has to be some reason adults want to learn whether it is to get a better job, to stop
themselves from getting in trouble, or because the topic interests them. This case study confirms
the need for adults to have an intrinsic or extrinsic motivation to learn safety behaviors or

111

otherwise they will not learn it. In this case study, the participants did not find an adequate
reason to learn or implement safety procedures or improve processes, thus they did not.
In this case study, the participants were unhappy with their work environment,
particularly what they perceived to be poor leadership who were more concerned about playing
politics and completing the mission than they were about the safety of their employees. Due to
their dissatisfaction with leadership, employees did not put any of the required annual training
they went through to use, thus continuing their behaviors which had led to unsafe actions. The
federal government mandates specific safety training every year for employees who engage in
activities such as working in confined spaces, tower climbing, working above six feet off the
ground, and electrical safety. However, it was evident based on the interviews that the
participants were required to sit through annual safety training, but they did not apply it in their
work as they discounted whether it was beneficial to them.
Knowles (2012) also states adults learn through the sharing of experiences which was
confirmed through the informal mentoring seen during observations. When adults are able to
share their experiences and relate their new information to previous experiences (their own or
shared with others), it allows them to situate the new learning into their cognitive understanding.
Experienced stakeholders mentoring new stakeholders demonstrated how adults learn from
experiences through the experienced stakeholder explaining the order of fixing broken things
when there is no standard protocol in place.
Motivation
Creech (n.d.), a military veteran found adults needed to be rewarded for their work in
order to increase their motivation to change towards a positive safety culture. Adding Knowles’s
(2012) idea of motivation being a tenet of adult learning, Creech firmly posited that on a military
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installation motivation was essential to creating and maintaining a successful organization.
Creech argued motivation, particularly in the forms of reward and recognition, was crucial was
because they were ways to measure positive behavior. Individuals would be rewarded through
something as simple as a command challenge coin (military paraphernalia), a shout-out during an
organizational formation, or something as important as a monetary award. This case study
seemed to affirm that without some type of positive motivation, such as personal recognition as
simple as a “good job” to monetary awards, the stakeholders will cease to learn or try to change
their behavior.
During the interviews, the participants repeatedly discussed how they were unmotivated
and not willing to change their behavior due to fear of how their leadership would react. The
lack of motivation they had to change their behavior demonstrates the impact leadership has to
either motivate or demotivate employees which furthers Creech’s (n.d.) position of leadership
rewarding positive behavior, but also setting measurable standards for what positive behavior
was. The participants in the case study could not articulate any situation where their suggestions
for improvement had been encouraged or welcomed, thus they stopped giving them.
Organizational Design and Culture
Robbins (1990) posits organizations are social groups of people with related goals and
defined boundaries. Weber (1947) describes the predominate type of organizational design as
bureaucratic which is a top down approach with little communication. He further describes it as
resistant to change while Hunsicker (2004) adds to this by stating that communication is a oneway model originating at the top and filtering downward.
The research provided by this case study reaffirms this idea as one of the major themes
was the lack of communication between senior leaders and the lowest level employees. The
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inability for free-flowing information and communication stifled the process of reporting hazards
as well as suggesting process improvements. This case study further affirms the design of the
organization prevents senior leaders from recognizing the unmitigated risks their lower level
employees are being asked to take with their personnel; the high accident rate and the multiple
statements by participants regarding how leaders seem like “magical unicorns” are primary
examples.
Schein (2004) posited communication is essential for an organization to adapt to an everchanging mission. As the military mission is dependent upon current events, it is just the type of
ever-changing mission Schein (2004) describes. The lack of communication demonstrated
through the organizational design puts a damper on the organizational culture as the key
fundamentals of senior leaders is not being shared at all levels. Stakeholders, in this case the
participants of the study are left to deal with the culture created by the negativity from middle
managers. Schein (1992) says it is the leadership who create a culture through their
communication, whether positive or negative, and it is again affirmed by the lack of morale,
disgruntled employees, and high accident rate demonstrated in this case study.
To further understand how the lack of communication impacts organizational culture,
Pater and Kroon (2011) point towards the accident rates of the organization in question. If the
rates are low, it indicates stakeholders feel comfortable reporting accidents, making process
improvements, and taking the initiative to think outside the box to prevent accidents. When
comparing this idea to the organization in question, it is reaffirmed communication is stifled at
the lowest level due to the higher than national average accident rates.
In the Pater and Kroon (2011) study, they found high accident rates were also indicative
of high mistrust in leaders which was again confirmed by this case study. With many of the
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participants calling mid-level leaders “chuckleheads” and “m-----------s”, it is fair to say the midlevel managers were distrusted. Interestingly, senior leaders were referred to as “magical
unicorns” rather than anything as blatantly negative. This differentiation indicates the distrust
and cultural breakdown within the organization likely stems from middle managers rather than
senior leaders.
Military Culture
Literature on military culture indicates it is a microcosm, or a world within a world with
language being one of the primary means to differentiate itself from other cultures (Huebner,
2013). During interviews for this case study, it was evident language was military-specific and
crossed all other social and cultural boundaries. With participants having served in the Army,
Navy, and Marine Corps the jargon was different, but quickly understandable when it was put
into context for other veterans to understand.
In addition to the language, the rank and structure of the military carried over to the case
study. The Department of Veterans Affairs (2014) found the structure of the military was very
rigid and created a sense of personal rules, regulations, and self-sacrifice. All of these items
were clearly seen during the interviews as well as during the observations. The participants
continually referenced the “chain-of-command” which is a military term implying the rank
structure. This behavior as well as the language verified the Department of Veterans Affairs
(2014) which indicated a person may leave the military, but the ideas and culture do not leave the
person after they take off the uniform.
Further, the case study confirmed the idea of group over self, or the continuous mission
above individual tenant. SgtMaj Berry (2003, p. 1) said “Marines will not tell you they are sick
until they go down hard. They are a proud bunch.” This statement encompassed the whole
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military culture of putting the mission first, troops (other organizational members) second, and
the individual dead last. With the interviews indicating many accidents go unreported and
personal risks taken all the time to make sure the mission is accomplished. The Department of
Veteran Affairs (2014) study found 63% veterans did not want to seek care in order to prevent
leadership from seeing them as “weak”; this is further proven by the interviews where the
participants admitted to getting hurt and not seeking treatment in order to prevent retribution or a
change in the way leadership perceives them.
Based on this case study’s finding of veterans being unwilling to admit they are hurt, it is
imperative this idea is further developed not only in practice for the work environment, but more
importantly while they are still active duty. Understanding why the mentality exists and how it
is developed will better help practitioners from a variety of fields understand how they can
minimize workplace accidents through the sense of duty. To better understand what the military
culture is surrounding accidents, it is important to also study accidents DOD and what their
associated costs are. Comparing that data to civilian accidents in DOD could shed light on what
the culture of DOD is when it comes to overall safety. Although this happens at installation,
understanding the big picture and translating best practices learned from them will benefit
organizations with a large contingent of veterans in it to create an organizational culture which
advocates the sense of self over organization.
Leadership Styles
Leading from the front was a common theme from the participants in that they desired a
leader who was willing to model behavior for them and then allow them to work independently.
Creech (n.d.) argued the most common type of leadership in a military setting would be
autocratic where a leader dictates his or her will from the top down with no room for two-way
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communication. This style of leadership was affirmed through the interviews, but there was a
clear desire for the leadership style to change as well.
Situational leadership (Hersey & Blanchard, 1998) is the idea of a leader flexing to meet
the needs of each stakeholder which is much more in-tune with the desire of the participants of
this case study. Situational leadership would allow leaders to model the desired behavior and
then let the stakeholders work independently—essentially leading from the front. Although this
type of behavior would further confirm Pater’s (2012) idea of empowering employees to make
on-the-spot changes in unsafe situations, it was unable to be confirmed as it was not employed at
the research site.
Further, it is difficult to recognize anything more than how strictly the case study
organization adhered to the autocratic leadership style. Blair (2013) argued a successful leader
was one who engaged with all levels of stakeholders, but this cannot be confirmed or denied as
the “magical unicorns” of senior leadership as well as middle management never once engaged
with the participants during this case study. It can likely be confirmed the converse of Blair’s
(2013) theory is correct—not engaging with stakeholders by senior leaders does not help and
likely hinders the organizational culture and communication.
To truly understand whether senior leaders make an impact on workplace safety, further
studies need to be conducted. The studies would need to encompass more than one installation
as there are so few senior leaders per installation, there may be issues with the culture or
organizational design which may be causing issues. Without making the study cover multiple
military installations, the results may be inaccurate.
Implications for Practice
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One of the biggest take-aways from this study was the need for leadership to be involved
at all levels of an organization in order to have employees believe their safety is valuable to the
success of the organization. When any level of leadership did not engage with employees of all
ranks and positions, employees equated this as not being important to the organization, hence
morale decreased. When morale decreased, accidents increased based on compared historical
accident rates and the shift in military leadership. Thus, it is important in practice for leaders to
actively engage with employees and make them stakeholders—crucial parts to the success of the
mission of the organization.
Being a stakeholder was not the only important thing a leader needed to do for accident
rates to decrease in an organization. In practice, it is important for a leader to lead from the
front, modeling the behavior desired of all employees. Leading from the front simply means
asking nothing of your employees that you are unwilling to do yourself. In this case study, only
the first level of management demonstrated the desired behavior while all levels above,
particularly middle management, demanded employees do unsafe things, like putting Omar on a
roof, without ever doing the same themselves. From this lack of leading from the front,
something all the military veteran participants desired, came the loss of respect for leadership.
When leadership lost the respect of the participants, the morale decreased to almost non-existent
levels and the accident rates increased
It is clear leaders must lead from the front or risk creating a culture which breeds distrust
and accidents. In order to develop leaders who are able to lead from the front, the hiring
practices of the federal government must be considered. When veterans were supervising
veterans, the supervisors seemed to gain more respect and understand the unique needs of the
veterans, while the non-veterans were seen as substandard, the hiring practices must be
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examined. Although it would be discriminatory to deny employment based on military
experience, somehow identifying potential supervisors who understand the nuances of the
military would benefit the federal government. As the veteran participants in this case study
sought to recreate military structures and practices, a supervisor who could understand and work
within those confines would likely be more successful.
In addition to identifying hiring practices not only based on skills, but also leadership
ability, additional training for supervisors would be beneficial as well. Almost all DOD
organizations mandate new supervisor training, but whether it is done effectively with a quality
instructor must be examined. If a quality instructor who can reach the learners is teaching a class
about how to reach military veterans in the workforce, the learners are more likely to retain and
practice the information. It would be imperative to have instructors who can relate and engage
the new hires (learners) in order to ensure transfer of training occurs. Without having an
effective instructor, it is likely the class would be just another ignored requirement by all parties
involved.
Outside of training, the idea of involved leaders in the military workplace who had open
communication would benefit practice. As all the participants of this case study equated their
personal safety to the visibility and lack of communication of their leadership, particularly
middle management, having leaders who actively engaged in the workplace would benefit
practice. Previous research (Creech, n.d.) in civilian organizations indicated leaders who
empowered their employees and actively engaged with them had better accident rates than their
peers who did not. In this case study, it would seem to confirm leaders on a military installation,
both military and civilian, need to actively engage their employees on all levels. Leaders must
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be seen, accessible, and engaged with all levels of employees to have employees believe their
safety is important to the success of the organization.
Communicating in the workplace is something which requires the active engagement of
leaders. Without leaders establishing relationships with employees, the bureaucracy of the
military structure will continue to skew and prevent any type of communication above the direct
supervisor. As veterans would not jump the chain of command, it puts the onus on the
leadership to create relationships and open the lines of communication to better understand the
hazards, pressures, and nuances of working in a particularly high hazard area like a military
installation. Without leadership taking the first step to open the lines of communication, it
further creates an opportunity for morale to decline and accidents to increase.
Recommendations for Future Research
One avenue for further study would be to specifically target the veteran population and
how they view their role in their workplace safety. It would also benefit practice to understand if
there is a relationship between a military work environment and the ability of veterans to recreate
their military structure. As one of the common themes was the participants seeking to recreate
the military structure, it would benefit practice to understand what about the structure is
appealing as well as whether veterans in a high hazard area are unique or if veterans in other
fields, particularly white-collar occupations seek to do the same. Understanding the motivation
of veterans and how to apply it in a military workplace would result in a better understanding of
what veterans need to keep them safe.
The lack of motivation demonstrated in this case study presents an area for future
research in practice in that if there are differing rewards which may motivate employees to
engage in safe behavior whether they are veterans or not. As being a veteran indicated
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employees were willing to put themselves in harm’s way, the area is open for research to see if
other organizations had employees who were willing to endanger themselves when they were
unmotivated due to poor leadership.
Further, understanding active duty military accident rates would benefit practice. There
is a clear connection between military veterans who are continually willing to risk their personal
safety in order to complete what seems like a trivial mission. Understanding why this is and if
the military has equally high accident rates would allow more intervention to prevent accident
acceptance mentality. A study which sought to actually capture military accident rates and what
the mentality behind them would perhaps shed light on if the military is creating a mentality of
preventable mishaps being a badge of honor or whether the idea of mission first could be altered.
An additional case study seeking to understand senior leaders who were successful in
creating safety cultures and what the best practices were would help to better define the
disconnect between leaders and employees within this particular case study. It was clear all
levels of leadership, but particularly senior leaders, were viewed as “magical unicorns”, but what
makes senior leaders of other organizations successful? Further studying this organization to
understand why middle management was so disliked may shed additional light on the situation
and negate the need to further study senior leaders.
Conclusion
The idea of the military being a microcosm was confirmed by this case study, at least in
regards to how civilians working for the military viewed their workplace safety and leadership.
What also came from the study was how veterans could not shake off their desire to relive the
military whether it was through their constant use of military jargon, holding themselves to
principles of mission first, self-last, shining their boots, or creating a chain-of-command and not
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deviating from it. These ideas are clear indications of how strong the military is in influencing
future behavior, but also indicates there may be self-imposed limitations on veterans to prevent
themselves from getting hurt at work. The code of silence created by the military structure
solidified how unique the military is in that people were willing to get hurt and put themselves in
harm every day just to uphold their own self-imposed code of silence.
Further, this case study presented the idea of autocratic leadership being the status quo
for military organizations but demonstrating it does not work for civilians. While military
members must adhere to rank and structure, if any level of leadership between the top and the
bottom struggles to communicate with other levels, then the entire system breaks down, opening
the government up to injury compensation costs, lost manhours, and poor productivity.
Understanding how to prevent such a breakdown in leadership will likely prove to be a positive
change within the entire DOD.
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APPENDIX A
Research Consent Form
WHY ARE YOU BEING INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH?
You are being invited to take part in a research study about leadership and safety. If you
volunteer to take part in this study, you will be one of less than 20 people to do so.
WHO IS DOING THE STUDY?
The person in charge of this study is Kelley Vandecoevering, Ed.D, ABD, M.Ed, MA, of
University of Memphis Department of Leadership (HIAD). She is being guided in this research
by Mitsunori Misawa, Ph.D. There may be other people on the research team assisting at
different times during the study.
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY?
By doing this study, we hope to learn how leadership impacts safety and what ways leadership
can be actively involved in safety. Through understanding how leadership impacts safety, the
lessons learned can be applied across the military to create safer environments for military and
civilian employees.
ARE THERE REASONS WHY YOU SHOULD NOT TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY?
You should not participate in this study if you are not of sound-mind or holding a leadership
position at a divisional level or above.
WHERE IS THE STUDY GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND HOW LONG WILL IT LAST?
The research procedures will be conducted at your office or place of your selection. It should
take about 30 minutes to complete.
WHAT WILL YOU BE ASKED TO DO?
You will be asked to answer questions honestly about your leadership and safety philosophies.
The questions are straight-forward and seek to understand, through your explanation, how your
leadership style and philosophy was developed, safety impacts your work environment, and how
the Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) impacts your environment.
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS?
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To the best of our knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm than you
would experience in everyday life.
In addition to the risk listed above, you may experience a previously unknown risk or side effect.
WILL YOU BENEFIT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?
There is no guarantee that you will get any benefit from taking part in this study. However, your
willingness to take part, however, may, in the future, help society as a whole better understand
this research topic.
DO YOU HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY?
If you decide to take part in the study, it should be because you really want to volunteer. You
will not lose any benefits or rights you would normally have if you choose not to volunteer. You
can stop at any time during the study and still keep the benefits and rights you had before
volunteering.
IF YOU DON’T WANT TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY, ARE THERE OTHER
CHOICES?
If you do not want to be in the study, there are no other choices except not to take part in the
study.
WHAT WILL IT COST YOU TO PARTICIPATE?
There are no costs associated with taking part in the study.
WILL YOU RECEIVE ANY REWARDS FOR TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?
You will not receive any rewards or payment for taking part in the study.
WHO WILL SEE THE INFORMATION THAT YOU GIVE?
We will make every effort to keep private all research records that identify you to the extent
allowed by law.
Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study.
When we write about the study to share it with other researchers, we will write about the
combined information we have gathered. You will not be personally identified in these written
materials. We may publish the results of this study; however, we will keep your name and other
identifying information private.
We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that
you gave us information, or what that information is. All written or recorded documentation will
be kept in a locked cabinet in which the investigator will have the only key.
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CAN YOUR TAKING PART IN THE STUDY END EARLY?
If you decide to take part in the study you still have the right to decide at any time that you no
longer want to continue. You will not be treated differently if you decide to stop taking part in
the study.
The individuals conducting the study may need to withdraw you from the study. This may occur
if you are not able to follow the directions they give you, if they find that your being in the study
is more risk than benefit to you, or if the agency funding the study decides to stop the study early
for a variety of scientific reasons.
ARE YOU PARTICIPATING OR CAN YOU PARTICIPATE IN ANOTHER
RESEARCH STUDY AT THE SAME TIME AS PARTICIPATING IN THIS ONE?
You may not take part in this study if you are currently involved in another research study. It is
important to let the investigator know if you are in another research study. You should also
discuss with the investigator before you agree to participate in another research study while you
are enrolled in this study.

WHAT IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS, SUGGESTIONS, CONCERNS, OR
COMPLAINTS?
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any
questions that might come to mind now. Later, if you have questions, suggestions, concerns, or
complaints about the study, you can contact the investigator, Kelley Vandecoevering at 910-9150696 or Dr. Misawa at 901-678-4060. If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer
in this research, contact the Institutional Review Board staff at the University of Memphis at
901-678-2705. We will give you a signed copy of this consent form to take with you.

_________________________________________
Signature of person agreeing to take part in the study

____________
Date

_________________________________________
Printed name of person agreeing to take part in the study
_________________________________________
Name of authorized person obtaining informed consent
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____________
Date

APPENDIX B
Semi-Structured Interview Guide
1. Define leadership:
How did you develop your leadership definition?
What are your experiences in formal leadership positions?
What are you experiences in informal leadership positions?
2. Describe your ideal leadership style.
What influenced your ideal leadership style?
What is your leader’s leadership style?
How is his or her leadership style implemented?
3. What is your leadership philosophy?
What is your leader’s leadership philosophy?
How does he or she communicate and demonstrate their philosophy to you?
How effective is your leader in translating their philosophy to the workplace?
4. What is workplace safety?
How do you impact workplace safety?
What types of actions improve workplace safety?
What previous experiences influenced your perception of workplace safety?
5. How does leadership impact the workplace safety?
What are the most beneficial ways leadership impact workplace safety?
What are the most common ways your leadership influences workplace safety?
Research Question Two
6. How do you know your leadership cares about you and your safety?
What actions do they take demonstrating they care about you?
When and how often do they take such actions?
7. Where can your leadership improve their safety leadership?
What emphasis do they place on safety with the workers?
How do they empower you in the safety area?
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What level of management impacts workplace safety the most?
8. What areas do you think leadership plays the biggest part in in regards to safety?
What areas are least impacted?
What can be done to improve the impacted areas for the better?
9. What is a workplace safety culture?
What is your opinion of your workplace safety culture?
What areas of your workplace safety culture are effective?
What areas of your workplace safety culture are ineffective or need improvement?
10. How do safe do you feel doing your job on a daily basis?
What factors influence how you feel about your safety?
How can your leadership improve your feelings of safety at work?
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APPENDIX C
Field Observation From

Field Observation Form
Location:_______________________________ Date/Time:__________________________
Task
Observed:___________________________________________________________________
Was supervisor or leader
1 present?
Did employee survey the
2 scene for safety hazards?
Were any safety hazards
3 present?
Did employee put on
4 appropriate PPE?
Did employee call for back
5 up if it was needed?
Did behavior change if
6 supervisor was present?
Comments:
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Yes

No
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